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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper 
assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, 
against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive 
the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort 
to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an 
assertion is, and what can make it insincere. 
Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be 
false, or unwarranted): in the second part of the thesis, I consider 
these kinds of impropriety. An influential hypothesis maintains that 
proper assertions must meet a precise epistemic standard, and 
several philosophers have tried to identify this standard.  After 
reviewing some difficulties for this approach, I provide an innovative 
solution to some known puzzles concerning this issue. In my view, 
assertions purport to aim at truth, but they are not subject to a norm 
that requires speakers to assert a proposition only if it is true. 
 
 
  
4 
 
5 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
I. An introduction ............................................................................................................ 11 
1. Lies ....................................................................................................................................................... 12 
2. Incorrect Assertions ............................................................................................................................. 16 
3. Outline of the Dissertation .................................................................................................................. 19 
 
Part A- Lying .................................................................................................................... 21 
A. The definition of lying ................................................................................................. 23 
1. The Classic Definition of Lying .......................................................................................................... 23 
2. The Current Debate: Deceptionist vs Non-Deceptionist accounts ................................................... 31 
II. Deceptionist definitions of lying: a critique ................................................................. 35 
1. The intention to deceive condition: an introduction ............................................................ 35 
2. Different versions of the intention to deceive condition ....................................................... 36 
2.1.  The “broad” IDC ............................................................................................................................ 36 
2.2. The “rigid” IDC ................................................................................................................................ 37 
2.3. The “believed sincerity condition” and the disjunctive account ..................................................... 38 
3. Against sufficiency: non-assertoric falsehoods that intend to deceive .................................... 42 
4. Against necessity: lying without the intent to deceive ............................................................ 46 
4.1 Lying under duress ............................................................................................................................ 46 
4.2 Bald-faced lies! ................................................................................................................................... 47 
5. Deceptionist Replies ............................................................................................................. 50 
5.1. Are bald-faced lies intended to deceive? ......................................................................................... 50 
5.2 Are bald-faced lies assertions? ........................................................................................................... 53 
6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 59 
III. Lying: a speech-act theoretic approach ...................................................................... 61 
1. Assertion-based definitions, and their difficulties ................................................................. 62 
1.1. Carson ............................................................................................................................................... 63 
1.2. Fallis ................................................................................................................................................... 65 
1.3. Stokke ................................................................................................................................................ 68 
2. Three Puzzles From Speech Act Theory ............................................................................. 71 
2.1 Explicit Performatives ........................................................................................................................ 72 
2.2. Determining which speech acts can be lies ...................................................................................... 74 
2.3. Insincerity Conditions ....................................................................................................................... 80 
3. A Speech-act Theoretic Account of Lying ............................................................................ 82 
3.1 The Assertion Condition ................................................................................................................... 82 
3.2 Illocutionary Entailment .................................................................................................................... 85 
4.  Testing the definition .......................................................................................................... 87 
4.1 Proviso Lies ........................................................................................................................................ 87 
4.2 The Speech-act Theoretic Puzzles .................................................................................................... 89 
5. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 94 
 
 
6 
 
 
IV. Insincerity .................................................................................................................. 97 
1. Insincerity: a preliminary account ........................................................................................ 99 
2. Beyond belief: insincerity and illocutionary acts ................................................................ 101 
2.1 The third speech act theoretic puzzle ............................................................................................. 101 
2.2 Expressing attitudes and (in)sincerity .............................................................................................. 102 
2.3 Insincerity conditions for promising ............................................................................................... 104 
2.4 A general account of the insincerity conditions for lying ............................................................... 108 
3. Insincere Promises: an experimental study ........................................................................ 110 
3.1 Testing folk intuitions about lying ................................................................................................... 110 
3.2 Aim of the study .............................................................................................................................. 111 
3.3 The predictions of existing theories ................................................................................................ 112 
3.4 Experiment 1 ................................................................................................................................... 113 
3.5 Experiment 2 ................................................................................................................................... 117 
3.6 Experiment 3 ................................................................................................................................... 118 
3.7 General discussion ........................................................................................................................... 120 
3.8. More on the results ........................................................................................................................ 120 
3.9 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 125 
4. Gradedness ........................................................................................................................ 127 
4.1 The dichotomic view and the traditional insincerity condition ..................................................... 127 
4.2 Graded Truth Values ...................................................................................................................... 129 
4.3 Graded beliefs .................................................................................................................................. 132 
4.4 A “graded” definition of insincerity ................................................................................................ 133 
4.5 Expressing graded beliefs and graded truth values ......................................................................... 138 
4.6 Further graded components ............................................................................................................ 144 
5.  Conclusions – A general account of insincerity ................................................................. 148 
 
Part B - The norms of assertion ..................................................................................... 153 
B. The norms of assertion ............................................................................................. 155 
V. A ‘constitutive’ norm? ........................................................................................ 161 
1. The orthodox account of constitutive norms ..................................................................... 161 
2. Williamson on constitutive norms ..................................................................................... 163 
3. The C-Rule as a Constitutive Rule ..................................................................................... 165 
3.1. Phrasing the C-rule as orthodoxly constitutive .............................................................................. 165 
3.2. An alternative constitutive reading ................................................................................................. 166 
3.3 Treating two rules as one ................................................................................................................ 167 
4. The C-Rule as a Regulative Rule ........................................................................................ 169 
4.1 The C-rule as orthodoxly regulative................................................................................................ 169 
4.2 Pollock’s paradigm: ‘prescriptive’ constitutive rules ....................................................................... 169 
4.3 All norms are constitutive in Pollock’s sense ................................................................................. 170 
4.4 The distinction is not meaningful ................................................................................................... 174 
5. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 175 
VI. Truth and assertion: rules vs aims ........................................................................... 179 
1. The disagreement about the norm of assertion .................................................................. 179 
1.1 The norm of assertion ..................................................................................................................... 179 
1.2 Intuitions and norms ....................................................................................................................... 181 
1.3 Falsity-Criticism and inadvertent violations .................................................................................... 182 
2. Lucky and unlucky assertions ............................................................................................ 184 
2.1 Lucky: inadvertent observation of TR ............................................................................................ 184 
2.2 Unlucky: inadvertent violation of TR/KR ...................................................................................... 185 
7 
 
2.3 Checkmating the speaker: a too demanding norm ......................................................................... 187 
3. Deriving permissibility from correctness ............................................................................ 189 
4. Truth as aim ....................................................................................................................... 192 
4.1 The difference between rules and aims .......................................................................................... 193 
4.2. Truth as a rule, truth as an aim ...................................................................................................... 194 
4.3 The truth-aim account ..................................................................................................................... 197 
4.4 Ought to try – from aims back to rules ........................................................................................... 199 
5. Objections, replies and clarifications .................................................................................. 202 
5.1 The source of normativity ............................................................................................................... 202 
5.2 Primary and secondary violations .................................................................................................... 203 
5.3 Challenges ........................................................................................................................................ 208 
5.4 Knowledge as the aim? .................................................................................................................... 208 
5.5 Alleged asymmetries ........................................................................................................................ 209 
6. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 211 
VII. Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 213 
References ..................................................................................................................... 231 
 
  
8 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ad Angiolino, Basilio e Riccardo 
 
  
10 
 
 
 
 
  
11 
 
I. An introduction 
 
 
 
It will be convenient to start from the beginning. In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat 
apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum (Jhn, 1, 1-3): “In the beginning was the Word, and the 
Word was with God, and the Word was God”. If in the beginning of time language was 
one with God and belonged to God, who is the source of all Truth (Pr, 8,7; Sam 7, 28; Rm 
3, 4), its evil relative, the lie, appeared short after creation. 
According to the Biblical myth, God told Adam: “Of every tree of the garden thou mayest 
freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in 
the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die” (Gen, 2, 16-17). But Satan, “the father 
of lies”, who “speaks his native language [when he lies]” (Jhn, 8, 44), under the fake 
appearance of a snake, told Eve: “Ye shall not surely die: For God doth know that in the 
day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good 
and evil” (Gen 3, 4-6). If we believe the Bible, this was the very first lie ever told; and it was 
this lie that determined the expulsion of humans from paradise, and the beginning of our 
history. 
In the Bible, truth and truthfulness associated with God and the Good; falsity and 
untruthfulness with the Devil and Evil. The precept “thou shalt not bear false witness against 
thy neighbour” (do not lie) figures in the Tenth Commandments that God gives to Moses 
on mount Sinai. The Bible is one of the foundational books of Western culture: it is not a 
coincidence that truthful and untruthful communications are central themes in this text, 
given their importance for humanity, and many are the parables and allegories that involve 
them. In a less allegoric fashion, and with more modest intentions, this dissertation will 
present and analyse, from a philosophical point of view, the opposition between these two 
opposite communicative forces. 
Communication is a fundamental ability of human beings – it is one of the abilities that 
makes us distinctively human. Unfortunately, the ability to communicate comes at a price: 
it makes it possible (and easy) for speakers to misrepresent what they believe, to 
communicate something false; in other words, it allows communicators to lie. This concept 
is beautifully illustrated in this famous quote from Umberto Eco (1975): 
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[The study of communication] is in principle the [study of] everything which can be 
used in order to lie. If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be 
used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be used "to tell" at all. 
 
Any signal that can be used to tell the truth can be used to tell a falsehood: the ability to 
communicate sincerely is essentially entangled with the ability to communicate insincerely. 
To some, it may appear that language is for this reason an intrinsically unreliable source of 
knowledge. After all, lying is not the only way in which language can deceive us. Not only 
speakers can be insincere: they can also be mistaken about what they say, and communicate 
falsehoods even when they are speaking in good faith. And still, despite the possibility of 
lies and mistakes, we believe most of what other people say.  
Rather than a matter of mere gullibility, the trust we place in each other’s reports is the 
result of our dependency on human communication for survival. Most of the 
knowledge we use to lead our daily lives comes from what others tell us. It is by trusting 
teachers and authors of books that we apprehended everything that we learnt in school: 
from physics to geography, from grammar to the whole history of the world. Even our own 
names are something we learn from hearsay, as none of us can recollect those initial days 
of our life in which we were given one.  Without the trust we place in communication, we 
would be paralyzed as epistemic agents, and it would be almost impossible for us to lead a 
meaningful life. And still, this does not mean that other people’s testimony is always 
reliable: it simply means that we cannot afford but to trust most of what we are told. 
Considering these issues, it becomes quite clear that understanding truthful and untruthful 
communication is of central importance, both for the study of language and that of our 
ordinary life. The aim of this dissertation is to explore untruthful communication from a 
philosophical point of view. The dissertation is divided in two parts; with some 
approximation, we could say that each part touches the two sides of this coin: the first part 
(A) deals with the deliberate communication of something false, the second part (B) with 
the accidental communication of something false. In what follows, I will clarify more in 
detail what this means, and to what extent this description is an approximation.  
 
1. Lies 
 
The first part of this dissertation (Part A) will cover philosophical problems related to lying, 
insincerity and deception. These phenomena are of fundamental importance in 
contemporary society, where communication plays an increasingly important role. To see 
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this, it will be helpful to look at some recent examples. If we limit the attention to politics, 
the current political debate has seen an unprecedented rise in lying and other forms of 
deceptive communication. Before the Brexit referendum in June 2016, UK media have 
infamously reported numerous false or deceptive claims. Among these, the false assertion 
that the NHS was “nearly at breaking point” due to “a massive influx of EU immigrants”, 
and that “more than 700 offences are being committed by EU immigrants every week” 1. 
The most blatant of these lies was the pledge to convert EU spending into NHS funding by 
£350m-a-week. Painted on the side of Vote Leave's big red bus, this pledge was hardly 
realisable, based on fraudulent data (net EU contribution was merely 160m-a-week at the 
time), and readily disowned by Brexiters within a few hours after the election was won2. 
The same year, the US presidential elections saw a similar upsurge of lies in political 
debates and campaigns. For Donald Trump’s in particular, lying has been a fundamental 
campaigning strategy. Journalist Maria Konnikova went as far as claiming that “the sheer 
frequency, spontaneity and seeming irrelevance of his lies have no precedent”3. This is 
hardly an exaggeration: a study shows that (out of a given sample) an estimate of 70% of 
Trump’s statements during the presidential campaign were false, another reported that in 
a one-hour-long TV appearance Trump managed to utter an astounding total of 71 lies4. 
Trump’s attitude has not changed since: this 23rd of June, six months after the elections, his 
dedication to lying has prompted the New York Times to dedicate a full page of the 
newspaper to print every lie that Trump has publicly told since taking office5. 
This apparent increase in political lying and deception has brought some commentators to 
question whether the UK referendum and the US elections were based on informed voting, 
an essential ingredient to a functioning democracy. Similarly, the legitimacy of the political 
decisions taken on the basis of such voting has been repeatedly put to question. More 
generally, these events have brought to the fore the importance of understanding lying and 
other form of deceptive communication. 
                                                 
1 Luke Lythgoe and Hugo Dixon, “EU-bashing stories are misleading voters – here are eight of the 
most toxic tales”, The Guardian (Thursday 19 May 2016). 
2 Ashley Kirk, “EU referendum: The claims that won it for Brexit, fact checked”, The Telegraph 
(13-03-2017); Jon Stone, The Independent, “Nigel Farage backtracks on Leave campaign's '£350m 
for the NHS' pledge hours after result” (24 June 2016). 
3 Maria Konnikova, “Trump’s Lies vs. Your Brain”, Politico Magazine (January 2017); “Donald 
Trump’s File at Politifact (url: http://www.politifact.com/personalities/donald-trump/); 
4 Dana Liebelson, Jennifer Bendery, Sam Stein, “Donald Trump Made Up Stuff 71 Times in an 
Hour”, Huffington Post (30-6-2017). 
5 David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, “Trump’s Lies”, New York Times (23-6-2017). 
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If understanding lies is important, it is not because of politics alone. Lies have been at the 
centre of the public debate for a number of other reasons. Famous sportsmen have 
infamously lied about taking performance-enhancing drugs, leading many supporters to 
question how fair these competitions are: if we consider the case of road cycling alone, 
famous are the cases of Tour de France winners Marco Pantani and Lance Armstrong, the 
latter of which was eventually stripped of all his titles. The job of a scientist is the pursuit of 
truth, but even academics are susceptible to the temptations of lying. One famous case 
is that of physicist Jan Hendrik Schön. His purported discoveries about molecular 
semiconductors were so revolutionary that the scientific world was expecting him to win 
the next Nobel Prize in Physics – then his data turned out to be fraudulent, Schön was 
fired and his PhD revoked6. More generally, humans are prone to lie, way more than we 
are usually willing to admit to ourselves: studies show that people on average report to 
lie one or two times a day (DePaulo et al. 1996) – but this rate can go as high as a mean 
of three lies a minute when we consider interactions with strangers (Feldman, Forrest & 
Happ 2002).   
In light of these observations, is not surprising that the study of lying, insincerity and 
deception is gaining centre stage in studies of linguistic communication: disciplines as 
diverse as sociology, forensics, psychology, and neuroscience have displayed an increasing 
interest in their analysis (Levine 2014). Philosophy certainly cannot aspire to develop lie-
detection techniques, and much less a ‘cure’ for lying, but it can certainly aim to understand 
this phenomenon, bring conceptual clarity to its study, and open the way for further 
investigation. Such is the purpose of the first half of this dissertation. 
To give an idea of what kinds of philosophical issues arise with regard to lying, it will be 
helpful to have a quick overview of the main philosophical debates concerning the issue. 
Perhaps the oldest recorded philosophical interest in lying can be traced back to the sixth 
century B.C.: it is in these times that Epimenides of Knossos developed the ‘liar paradox’, 
challenging logicians to determine the truth value of statements of the form “I always lie” 
for the centuries to come. 
Throughout history, however, the most discussed issue in the philosophy of lying has almost 
certainly been that of the morality of lying. Questions like “is it ever morally permissible to 
lie – and if so, under which conditions?” have gripped philosophers throughout history: 
from Augustine to Aquinas, from Kant to Grotius, many established moral philosophers 
                                                 
6 Leonard Cassuto, “Big trouble in the world of 'Big Physics'”, The Guardian (18-9-2002). 
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have tried to tackle these conundrums. A related philosophical issue is that of the 
permissibility of political lying. A tradition from Plato to Leo Strauss has defended the claim 
that lying for the common good is permissible and recommended for a virtuous leader; an 
opposing tradition disagrees – amongst other reasons, on the ground that political lying 
undermines democratic institutions (cf. Carson forthcoming). More recently, philosophical 
interest in lying has emerged in the contemporary debate in epistemology. Around the 
1980s, philosophers got more and more interested in the transmission of knowledge via 
testimony – i.e., knowledge that epistemic agents learn from words. Within this field of 
inquiry, lies are philosophically significant, as they represent a potential hindrance to the 
social process of knowledge transmission.  
Each of these philosophical questions (except for the liar paradox) presuppose a 
clarification of the concept of lying: to be able to tackle them, we need first to determine 
what lying is – and this, in itself, is a philosophical question. Rather than delving into any 
specific debate on lying, thus, the first part of this dissertation will be devoted to respond to 
this foundational question: “what is lying?”. More specifically, it will attempt to identify 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement to count as a lie. This apparently easy 
task will turn out to be one of the most challenging for the philosophy of lying: it is not easy 
to identify a definition that is resistant to counterexamples; furthermore, an informative 
analysis of lying demands further analysis of a number of neighbouring concepts – such as 
insincerity, assertion and deception.  
In attempting to define a concept, this dissertation places itself in the tradition of conceptual 
analysis. A central idea within this tradition is that we can learn something about a given 
concept by breaking it down into its essential components. In this sense, the desideratum 
of a theory of lying is to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be 
a lie. 
From a methodological point of view, this means that a good analysis of lying should neither 
be too broad (it should not be subject to counterexample to the sufficiency of the analysis) 
nor too narrow (there should not be counterexamples to its necessity). The litmus test for 
a good definition here are intuitions: there is consensus that a good definition should reflect 
our intuitions about particular cases. There is disagreement as to the scope of ‘our’ here – 
some scholars think that a good definition should reflect laypeople’s intuitions, other that 
expert intuitions are more important. Ideally, a good definition should meet the intuitions 
of both groups. 
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As I proceed in my analysis, I will argue in favour of a number of claims about lies. Some 
will be claims about conceptual possibilities and unusual lies: that there can be lies that are 
not intended to deceive; that there can be lies that are true, that there can be lies that we 
believe to be true. Even though each of these claims may sound astounding, I will show that 
they are perfectly consistent with our intuitions about particular cases, and relevant to the 
understanding of what lying is. Some other claims will be about the inability of traditional 
definitions to explain some standard features of lying: for instance, standard definitions 
struggle to explain that one can lie by promising something, that all lies always involve the 
undertaking of some distinctive responsibility, and that lies can be more or less insincere, 
depending on our degree of confidence of our beliefs, and on the hedges and other 
linguistic devices that we use to express such believes. As I review and criticise the existing 
literature, I will develop my own definition of lying – hopefully, one that will be useful to 
solve other philosophical problems about lying, such as ethical and epistemological ones. 
For a more detailed breakdown of the topics that will be touched in this part of thesis, the 
reader can refer to the Plan of the Work (I.3).  
 
2. Incorrect Assertions  
 
While the first part of the thesis deals with insincere communication, the second part deals 
with irresponsible communication: statements that are at fault not because they are 
insincere, but rather because they are false, or because they are not supported by adequate 
evidence. There are uncountable real-world examples of this sort of communicative 
improperness; to find one to which we are all acquainted, it will be helpful to consider some 
popular conspiracy theories. Even if we limit our attention to wildly implausible (yet 
popular) ones, the list of such theories is endless: one claims that the Earth is hollow and 
secret civilisations live inside it, in the hidden city of Agarthaa, illuminated by an internal 
sun; another that the Earth is flat, and that governments create false evidence to trick us 
into believing the opposite; others that our planet has been visited by aliens, and 
governments operate to destroy all signs of contact with extra-terrestrial life. 
What is at issue here is not why conspiracy theorists believe in these theories, or what is 
wrong with such beliefs. It is rather the role that conspiracy theorists have in the propagation 
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of these falsehoods – their role as communicative agents. Conspiracy theorists are not liars7: 
when they assert that the Earth is flat or hollow, they do it in good faith, sincerely. But even 
if their assertions are not lies, they are importantly at fault.  
In the age of social media, this form of irresponsible communication has become even 
more problematic and apparent. On the one hand, social media make it easier for people 
to share false information, without verifying its veracity. On the other hand, social media 
allow this information, shared in good faith, to reach a wider audience – often with 
catastrophic effects. One infamous example is the epidemic sharing of the fake news that 
Pope Francis endorsed Donald Trump during the US electoral campaign. Initially posted 
by the satirical fake news website WTOE 5 News, the news was shared by roughly a million 
of Facebook users, giving the rumour a resonating voice: it was the most shared news posted 
during the elections, outperforming any real one at the moment. Considering a larger 
sample, a study shows that pro-Trump fake news stories received around 30 million shares 
on Facebook during the electoral campaign, and often more attention than real ones8. 
Overall, this kind of data strongly suggests that the irresponsible communicative behaviour 
of some voters (their sharing unconfirmed news coming from dubious sources) might have 
strongly influenced the outcome of the last US elections. 
The communication of false information and unwarranted claims thus poses a serious 
threat to a citizen’s access to reliable, factual information – and to some extent to democracy 
itself, as long as we understand this institution to be reliant on informed voting. In some 
cases, it can even be a threat to people’s lives and wellbeing. Such in the case of the 
disinformation spread by the anti-vaccine movement, that has led to an upsurge in deaths 
by otherwise curable diseases, with an estimated death toll of about 9 thousand people since 
20079. 
I have already pointed out that conspiracy theorists and anti-vaccine activists are not lying 
when they propagate their falsehoods (since they believe in them), and that nonetheless 
their communicative behaviour is at fault. If not lying, which kind of communicative fault 
is committed in these cases? The second part of the dissertation attempts to answer this 
                                                 
7 An exception might apply to the initial propagator(s) of the theory, who could have invented it with 
deceptive intentions. For the purpose of the present discussion, let us call a conspiracy theorist only 
someone who genuinely believes in a false and implausible conspiracy theory. 
8 Craig Silverman, “This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real 
News On Facebook”, Buzzfeed (16-11-2016); Jason Tanz, “Journalism fights for survival in the 
post-truth era”, Wired, (14-2-2017). 
9 Anti-vaccine body count, at http://www.jennymccarthybodycount.com/ 
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question: it aims to understand, on a general level, what kind of communicative expectation 
is violated when people assert false or unwarranted propositions. This sort of question has 
gained centre stage in the philosophical debate in recent times. For reasons that I will 
discuss more in detail later, in the last 20 years philosophers have become more and more 
convinced that assertions (claims that something is true) are governed by a single rule – a 
rule whose violation can explain the distinctive wrongness involved in uninformed and false 
statements. Scholars working in this tradition tend to adopt the following hypothesis (or a 
hypothesis along the following lines): 
 
Assertion is the only speech act governed by the following rule: you should not assert a 
given proposition unless condition C is satisfied 
 
According to this hypothesis, there is a condition that must be satisfied for an assertion to 
be appropriate, and if we replace ‘C’ with that condition, we obtain the norm that governs 
all assertions. This hypothesis offers a simple model to explain what is wrong with assertions 
by uninformed speakers (like conspiracy theorists and anti-vaccine activists): these 
assertions are at fault not because they are lies, but because they violate the norm governing 
all assertions. Just like we expect people not to lie, we expect speakers to follow the norm; 
when they fail to do so, a violation occurs, making ground for reproach, criticism and 
blame.  
Given that the hypothesis leaves condition C unspecified, a great deal of the explanation 
will turn on how one specifies condition C. To see a few candidates, let us consider a real 
life scenario. Suppose that, after reading about the fake news that the Pope endorsed 
Trump on the satirical news site WTOE 5 News, an American citizen (call him Ferdinand) 
tells another friend that the pope endorsed Trump as a presidential candidate. Now, we 
might have the intuition that Ferdinand’s assertion is wrong because it is not true, which 
gives us a first candidate for condition C: do not assert a proposition unless it is true. But 
some other people might have the intuition that Ferdinand’s assertion is wrong for different 
reasons. For instance, Ferdinand does not have the appropriate evidence to make such a 
claim: he failed to check whether the information came from a reliable source (as a matter 
of fact, it did not), which is especially pernicious given the implausibility of the proposition 
(there are many known ideological disagreements between the Pope and Donald Trump). 
If one has this intuition, it is not the falsity of the proposition that should explain the 
wrongness of Ferdinand’s assertion; rather, the lack of appropriate evidence. We now have 
a second candidate formulation of condition C: do not assert a proposition unless you have 
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appropriate evidence. Yet, some other people might intuit that Ferdinand’s assertion is at 
fault in both ways: you should neither assert what is false, nor what is not supported by 
appropriate evidence. If this is the case, then perhaps condition C is that a speaker should 
only assert what he knows (as knowledge requires both truth and appropriate evidence).  
These are but a few possible solutions to the question raised by the hypothesis. There is a 
vast literature on the issue, ripe with different accounts of what makes an assertion 
permissible. For the moment, I will not enter the intricacies of this debate, nor will I attempt 
to explain which account offers a better explanation of the norm regulating assertion. All I 
aimed to clarify is that the hypothesis that assertion is subject to a single epistemic norm has 
the potential to explain what is wrong with assertions that are not lies, but that are 
nonetheless false or unwarranted. This will be the explanandum of the second part of the 
dissertation. In those pages, I will assess the solidity of the hypothesis to which the scholars 
involved in the debate subscribe, and attempt to establish which kind of condition C should 
be.  
 
3. Outline of the Dissertation 
 
As already mentioned, this dissertation is divided into two parts. Part A discusses problems 
concerning lying, and part B problems relating to the norm of assertion. 
Part A opens by introducing the philosophical debate about the definition of lying. In the 
contemporary discussion, two factions are opposed: deceptionist, who believe that lies 
necessarily aim at deceiving someone, and non-deceptionist, who deny this necessary 
condition. Chapter 2 presents some known arguments against deceptionist definitions, and 
supplements them with novel arguments. It concludes by responding to some recent 
objections presented by deceptionists in reply to these arguments. Chapter 3 turns to 
criticisms of the other faction, non-deceptionism. It opens by recapitulating some known 
counterexamples that affect each of the most popular non-deceptionist definitions. It then 
proceeds to show that all these accounts have a common defect in common: they cannot 
deal with three ‘speech-act theoretic’ puzzles about lying – puzzles that involve lies 
performed by means of a speech act other than assertion. To find a solution to these 
puzzles, I turn to speech act theory, with the aid of which I develop a non-deceptionist 
definition that avoids the objections to which all the other definitions are subject. In order 
to further refine this account, Chapter 4 tackles the problem of defining insincerity. It is 
divided into four main sections. The first extends the insincerity conditions to speech acts 
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other than assertion, showing how insincerity is not necessarily a matter of beliefs. The 
second tests this account against ordinary speaker intuitions, finding support for the 
proposed account. The third deals with the problem of graded insincerity. Speakers can be 
more or less confident in what they say, and communicate a higher or lower degree of 
confidence in what they say. Insincerity involves some discrepancy between the belief held 
by the speaker and the belief communicated by its utterance: my account proposes a system 
to model this issue and define which degree of discrepancy is required to call something a 
lie. In the closing section, I bring together all the findings, to develop a unified definition of 
lying. 
Part B begins by introducing the norm of assertion hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, 
there is one norm that defines whether a proposition can be asserted or not, and this norm 
takes the form: “assert that p only if p has C”. In order to identify which propositions are 
assertable, philosophers have to determine exactly which property is C. Chapter 5 puts 
some pressure on this hypothesis, and more specifically on the idea that the envisaged norm 
is constitutive of assertion. It shows that different authors writing on the norm of assertion 
have interpreted this claim in different ways. I argue that no matter which interpretation is 
chosen, the idea that the envisaged norm is constitutive of assertion is misguided. Once one 
recognises this, the assumption that assertion is subject to only one norm of this kind loses 
its appeal, and so does the idea that assertion can be defined as the only speech act that is 
only subject to this rule. Chapter 6 reviews two ways of fleshing out the norm of assertion 
hypothesis: factive and non-factive accounts. The former maintain that only true 
propositions are assertable, whereas the latter deny this, and argue that some false 
propositions are assertable. Factivist positions are subject to known counterexamples 
(unlucky assertions), but they are generally defended with a reasonable argument: that only 
a factive account can explain why false assertions are incorrect and liable to criticism. I deny 
this claim, showing that the same data can be explained by taking truth to be the purported 
aim, rather than the rule, of assertion. I conclude by arguing that, in the light of this data, 
the account offering the best prediction will be one featuring one or more non-factivist rules, 
paired with the view that assertion aims at truth. In Chapter 7 I summarise the key ideas 
that I defended throughout the thesis. 
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A. The definition of lying 
 
 
 
Each of the two parts of this dissertation will feature an introductory chapter like the present 
one – labelled with a letter, instead of a number, to indicate its different nature. In this 
introductory chapter, the philosophical debate on the definition lying is presented. After a 
short historical introduction, I introduce the classic definition of lying. This definition 
involves two key conditions: the statement condition and the insincerity condition. Each is 
briefly introduced and explained with the help of examples. I then proceed to consider the 
contemporary debate, that involves an opposition between two opposite factions: 
deceptionist and non-deceptionist (or assertion-based) definitions. After presenting each of 
them, I set the ground for the discussion in the further chapters. 
 
 
1. The Classic Definition of Lying 
 
As Augustine gracefully points out in his De Mendacio (possibly the first work to 
systematically discuss this issue), the question of lying “is, indeed, very full of dark corners, 
and has many cavern-like windings, whereby it oft eludes the eagerness of the seeker; so 
that at one moment what was found seems to slip out of one's hands, and anon comes to 
light again, and then is once more lost to sight”. Augustine is stressing an important truth: 
defining lying (and the morality thereof) is a more difficult task than it seems at first sight. 
As a matter of fact, the history of philosophy has proved him right: in almost two millennia 
of discussion, scholars have not reached a consensus about which definition best captures 
the concept of lying. 
Nevertheless, even though there is no agreed upon definition of lying, there are some firm 
points of agreement. If our discussion of the definition of lying has to start somewhere, it 
probably has to start from such firm points. Three in particular seem to be resistant to even 
the strongest scepticism. First, lying is an intentional act: there is no such thing as lying 
unintentionally. Second, lying requires making a statement: in order to tell a lie, you have 
to produce some linguistic token. Third, lying requires making an insincere statement: there 
is no such a thing as a sincere lie, because lying involves stating something that you do not 
believe. 
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From these three firm points, we can get to a first tentative definition of lying:  
 
Classic definition: 
(CD) To lie is to intentionally state something that you believe to be false 
 
This definition gets most simple cases right. Consider an obvious example of lying: if 
Pinocchio tells Geppetto “I went to school this morning” even if he did not go, intuitively 
he has lied. Since Pinocchio is intentionally telling Geppetto what he believes to be false, 
the definition correctly dubs this case a lie. Now, suppose that later that day, Pinocchio is 
asked where Geppetto is. Pinocchio has seen Geppetto at the workshop, so he replies “My 
dad is at the workshop”. It turns out that Pinocchio is wrong, as Geppetto snuck out of the 
workshop to visit his lover in secret. In this case, Pinocchio has said something false, but 
his statement is sincere: intuitively, he has not lied. Once again, the intuition is tracked by 
the definition, that rules out this case as the statement is not believed to be false. At first 
blush, the classic definition deals correctly with simple cases of lying, and correctly 
distinguishes them from other false or deceptive utterances. 
I called this definition ‘classic’. This term may seem unorthodox to some readers, as 
philosophers (e.g. Lackey 2013, Mahon 2015) often have in mind a different definition 
when they talk about the standard or traditional definition of lying (which I will soon 
introduce as the ‘deceptionist definition’). I purposefully chose the term ‘classic’ instead of 
‘standard’ or ‘traditional’ to acknowledge this departure from orthodox terminology. Such 
departure is justified by two reasons. The first is that this was very likely the first 
philosophical definition to appear in the literature, and remained the standard definition 
for at least a thousand years: introduced by Augustine (DM, IV AD), it is still considered 
the standard view in the works of Aquinas (ST, XIII AD) and Peter Lombardus (SEN, 
XIII AD) 10. The second reason is that, while there is no consensus as how to define lying, 
the overwhelming majority of scholars agree that intentionally stating what you believe to 
be false is a necessary condition for lying: you cannot lie unless you meet the conditions 
                                                 
10 Contrary to what is argued by some authors (Siegler 1969: 129n), Aquinas did not require a 
deceptive intention: “The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, 
as neither does any effect belong to the species of its cause” (Aquinas ST, II, IIae, q110, a2). 
Augustine’s case is more complex: the traditional interpretation is that he endorsed the intention to 
deceive condition (e.g. Siegler 1969: 129n; Feehan 1988; 135-8) but according to Griffiths (2004: 
30) this view is misguided, and there are better reasons to think that he was partisan of a “non-
deceptionist” definition of lying. I believe that an accurate and charitable reading of Augustine’s 
work can only support an interpretation lying between these two extremes: Augustine simply did 
not settle the question as to whether a deceptive intention is required for lying or not. 
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stated by (CD). In other words, the current consensus is that (CD) offers an accurate 
characterisation of lying, even if it is arguably not an accurate enough definition – because 
meeting the conditions stated in (CD) may not be sufficient for a statement to qualify as a 
lie. 
The current debate on the definition of lying mainly revolves around the question of which 
additional condition is best suited to make the definition meet sufficiency. Before entering 
the current debate, however, it is worth familiarising ourselves a bit more with the points of 
agreement set by the classic definition. More specifically, in the next two sections I will 
discuss in detail the two main requirements posited by the classic definition: the statement 
condition and the (intentional) insincerity condition.  
 
1.1 The Statement Condition 
 
You! You chameleon! Bottomless bag of tricks! Here 
in your own country would you not give your 
stratagems a rest or stop your spellbinding for an 
instant? 
 
Homer, Odyssey, XXIV 
 
In his Parerga e Paralipomena (1851/1974:538), Arthur Schopenhauer writes that “there is 
in the world only one mendacious and hypocritical being, namely man. Every other is true 
and sincere, in that it frankly and openly declares itself to be what it is and expresses itself 
as it feels”. Unlike animals, whose ingenuity and transparency is fascinating to us, the 
degenerate human tendency to lie “stands as a blot on Nature”. Schopenhauer’s severe 
verdict is certainly inaccurate, given that plants and animals are capable of incredibly 
complex forms of deception. However, in his observation we can find a grain of truth: 
arguably, non-humans cannot lie, at least if lying requires telling a lie – that is, uttering a 
linguistic token that we believe to be false.  
The intuition that lying requires linguistic abilities is reflected by the classic definition of 
lying, according to which lying involves stating a proposition, or saying something. Following 
Mahon (2015), I call this the statement condition for lying. The statement condition 
captures the intuitive difference between lying and other forms of deception. Pace to 
Schopenhauer, countless examples of deception can be found in nature to illustrate this 
distinction. For instance, the orchid Cryptostylis erecta is pollinated by the so-called orchid 
dupe wasp (Lissopimpla excelsa), the males of which mistake the flower parts for female 
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wasps, and copulate with them. While there is a sense in which the wasp is deceived by the 
orchid’s shape, it would be erroneous to say that the orchid lied to the wasp. The statement 
condition thus captures the intuitive distinction between lying and simple deception. 
A few authors reject the difference between deception and lying 11. However, this leads them 
to conclusions that are rather counterintuitive. As a reduction ad absurdum, it will suffice 
to remark that Smith (2004), who rejects the statement condition, lists as lies “breast 
implants, hairpieces, fake orgasms and phony smiles, as well as age-concealing make up 
and deodorants that disguise our scent”. While these cases usually involve attempted 
deception, they are clearly not lies. Claiming that wearing deodorant is lying can strike as 
bizarre, and illustrates the counterintuitive consequences of rejecting the statement 
condition.  
The view that lying involves stating something can be traced back to Augustine’s seminal 
work. In his Contra Mendacio (XII) he writes that “a lie is a false signification by 
words”. Aquinas (ST, q110), who knew Augustine’s work thoroughly, rightly specifies that 
this does not mean that lying is necessarily a matter of verbal communication:  
 
As Augustine says [DDC, II], words hold the chief place among other signs. And so 
when it is said that "a lie is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes 
every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false by 
means of signs, he would not be excused from lying 
 
These observations are the right track: there are cases of lying that do not involve the use 
of words. One can lie by using any sort of conventional signals, or combinations thereof. 
For instance, you can lie by using body gestures that have conventional meaning (as in 
nodding with your head to agree), or using smoke signals, and so on. To capture all these 
cases, scholars working on lying usually refer to Chisholm and Feehan’s (1977:150) 
definition of statement: 
 
                                                 
11 These are generally biologists (e.g. Smith 2000, Dawkins 1989:64) and psychologists (e.g. Ekman 
1985:26-8, Vrij 2008), who often treat the verb “lying” as equivalent to “intentionally deceiving”.  
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Definition of Statement (Chisholm & Feehan) 
S states that p to A iff 
(a) S believes that there is an expression E and a language L such that one of the 
standard uses of E in L is that of expressing the proposition p; 
(b) S utters E with the intention of causing A to believe that he, S, intended to utter E 
in that standard use 
 
In other words, a lie has to be a linguistic token that is believed to expresses a proposition, 
and that is believed to do so in virtue of some linguistic convention. This formulation of 
the statement condition is preferable to Augustine’s, as it does not seem that “every sign” 
used to signify something false can be used for lying. Consider the example of wearing a lab 
coat to pretend that you are a scientist, or a ring to pretend that you are married. In these 
cases, you use a sign to communicate something false, but you are not lying. The statement 
condition proposed by Chisholm and Feehan correctly rules out these cases. To go back 
to Schopenhauer’s erroneous claims about nature’s intrinsic sincerity, another example of 
deceptive signals that are not lies is found in animal signalling. Many animals produce 
signals that are associated with a stimulus. Sometimes, however, they use such signals in the 
absence of the stimulus, for deceptive purposes. For instance, Lanio Versicolor sentinel 
birds are known to produce alarm calls in the absence of predatory birds, in order to scare 
their conspecifics when the competition for food is high (Munn 1986). According to the 
statement condition, and consistently with intuitions, these alarm calls are deceptive, but 
are not lies12.  
Lastly, some authors (Siegler 1966, MacCormick 1983, Fallis 2010; 2013; 2014, Meibauer 
2011; 2014, Saul 2012, Stokke 2013; 2017, Viebahn 2017) prefer to use the term ‘saying’ 
                                                 
12 Some might argue that some animal signalling can count as lying. It is unclear whether non-human 
animals can meet the statement condition, which requires the ability to communicate in a language 
that assigns meanings to expressions. But if some animals can communicate in a language, it could 
be argued that they can also lie. Some cases of animals that purportedly used language to lie are 
reported in the literature. For instance, Fouts & Mills (1997:156) report the following dialogue with 
Lucy, a chimpanzee trained to speak in American Sign Language: 
Fouts: What that? [indicating a pile of chimpanzee feces on the floor] 
Lucy: What that? 
Fouts: You known. What that? 
Lucy: Dirty dirty. 
Fouts: Whose dirty dirty? 
Lucy: Sue. [a reference to Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, a graduate student of Fouts] 
Fouts: It not Sue. Whose that? 
Lucy: Roger! 
Fouts: No! Not mine. Whose? 
Lucy: Lucy dirty dirty. Sorry Lucy. 
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in place of ‘stating’. In the literature, the two terms are understood to be synonyms: they 
both indicate the utterance of a meaningful declarative sentence. However, it should be 
noted that a minority of authors that use the term ‘saying’ (Saul 2012, Viebahn 2017) do 
this to mark their commitment to a slightly different version of the statement condition – 
more specifically, a Gricean account of what it means to say something. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, however, we can safely ignore this subtle distinction. Consequently, in this 
dissertation I will treat ‘saying’ and ‘stating’ as synonymous. 
 
1.2 The Insincerity Condition 
 
Non enim omnis qui falsum dicit mentitur  
si credit aut opinatur verum esse quod dicit 
 
Augustine, De Mendacio, 3.3 
 
 
According to the insincerity condition, the speaker has to believe that what is said is false. I 
call this condition the insincerity condition, because it captures the difference between an 
insincere utterance (that you believe to be false) and a mere mistake (that you believe to be 
true, but turns out to be false). Going back to the previous example, if Pinocchio mistakenly 
believes that Geppetto is in the workshop and voices his mistake, he says something false, 
but he does not lie: while incorrect, his utterance is sincere. The insincerity condition 
captures this intuition: saying something false does not amount to lying, unless the falsehood 
is also believed to be false.  
Importantly, requiring that the statement is believed to be false is not yet requiring that the 
lie must be false. Most scholars deny that actual falsity is necessary for lying13. However, a 
few authors (Grotius RWP:1209, Benton forth, Turri & Turri 2016) have suggested that 
falsity of the statement, in addition to belief in its falsity, is required for lying. For these 
authors, if your believed-false utterance turns out to be true, you have not lied. People seem 
                                                 
13 Augustine (DM, 3.3), Aquinas (ST, II-II, q.110, a1), Kant (1797), Leonard (1959:182), Isenberg 
(1964:466; 1974), Lindley (1971), Mannison (1969:138), Chisholm & Feehan (1977), Kupfer 
(1982:104), Adler (1997), Williams (2002), Mahon (2008), Fallis (2009). Other authors endorse 
weaker positions. Carson (1982:16; 2006:284; 2010:39) and Saul (2012) provide a definition that 
does not require falsity, but both suggest that the definition could be strengthened to include such 
a requirement. Siegler (1966:132) suggests that falsity is necessary for telling a lie but not for lying; 
less controversially, Coleman & Kay (1981:28) argue that falsity is necessary for prototypical lying. 
29 
 
to have different intuitions in this respect. For our purposes, it will suffice to say that the 
classic definition gives the opposite verdict, and counts inadvertent truth-telling as lying. 
The insincerity condition also grounds the intuitive distinction between lying and merely 
misleading. A classic example of misleading that falls short of lying is found in the 
hagiography of St. Athanasius (MacIntyre 1994: 336): 
 
Persecutors, dispatched by the emperor Julian, were pursuing [Athanasius] up the 
Nile. They came on him travelling downstream, failed to recognise him, and enquired 
of him: “Is Athanasius close at hand?” He replied: “He is not far from here.” The 
persecutors hurried on and Athanasius thus successfully evaded them without telling 
a lie.  
 
In this example, Athanasius is attempting to deceive is pursuers by implying that he is not 
Athanasius. While deceptive, his carefully phrased sentence is true; intuitively, it does not 
constitute a lie. The insincerity condition makes sense of this intuition: it predicts that this 
is not a lie, given that Athanasius does not believe that what he has said is false. 
Finally, according to the classic definition the speaker has to intentionally say what he 
believes to be false. This requirement of intentionality is found in some classic texts; here 
is how Griffiths (2004:27) introduces it: 
 
Them is an internal fact and an external fact. The internal is what's in the mind 
(animus—Augustine often also uses "heart," cor, or "mind," mens, for the same 
purposes) and the external is what's said or communicated in some other way—by 
gesture or expression or some other nonverbal sign. Lying happens when the two are 
intentionally separated. (my emphasis) 
 
One way of understanding the requirement that the speaker intentionally says what he 
believes to be false is for it to be a refinement, or specification, of the insincerity condition. 
To be insincere, in this sense, is to intentionally establish a discrepancy between what you 
believe and what you say. To some, the adverb ‘intentionally’ may seem redundant here. 
After all, unintentional falsities (i.e. mistaken but sincere statements, as in Pinocchio’s 
statement that Geppetto is in the workshop) are already ruled out by the requirement that 
the speaker says something he believes to be false. However, the intentionality constraint 
plays an important role here: it rules out other species of accidental falsehoods from the 
definition of lying and insincerity.  
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Linguistic mistakes (cases in which when the speaker misspeaks, or gets confused about the 
meaning of words) offer a first example of such accidental falsehoods. Saul (2012:14, see 
also 2012:16) has a rather amusing example:  
 
Anna, an English rock climber, wanted to tell her [Mexican] colleagues that many 
people in England climb without ropes. So she uttered (2): 
 
(2) En Inglaterra hay mucha gente que escala sin ropa 
 
(2) actually means that in England there are many people who climb without clothes 
[ropa]. This claim is false, but Anna did not lie; she accidentally said something false, 
through a linguistic error. 
 
A definition that only requires a liar to state a believed-false statement would count (2) as a 
lie: Anna has said that people in England climb without clothes, and she believes this to be 
false. However, Anna has not said what she believed to be false intentionally, so that this 
case is not counted as a lie by the classic definition. The intentionality requirement is thus 
indispensable to maintain the distinction between lies and malapropisms. 
Self-deception also generates examples of accidental falsehoods that can only be addressed 
by the intentionality constraint on insincerity. Self-deception is a psychological condition 
whereby one convinces oneself of the truth of something that one knows to be false (hence 
the deception), and has no awareness of being so deluded. In other words, when you are 
self-deceived about p, you believe that you believe that p, but you do not in fact believe that 
p. Ridge (2006:488–9) offers an example: 
 
Bob believes that he believes his mother loves him but actually does not believe that 
she loves him. In fact, Bob believes his mother hates him. [...] Suppose we ask Bob 
whether his mother loves him and he says, ‘‘Yes, of course she does’’.  
 
In this case, Bob is saying something that he believes to be false. Nonetheless, he is not 
saying something he believes to be false intentionally. Once more, the intentionality 
constraint on insincerity is doing the heavy lifting in distinguishing lying from other 
accidental falsehoods: were we not to require that the “separation between mind and words” 
was intentional, we would incorrectly count these cases as lies.  
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2. The Current Debate: Deceptionist vs Non-Deceptionist accounts 
 
There should be no doubt at this point as to the exact meaning of (CD) within the debate 
on lying, and the arguments that support it should be clear. 
 
Classic definition: 
(CD) To lie is to intentionally state something that you believe to be false 
 
Now, I have already mentioned that while there is consensus that (CD) offers an accurate 
characterisation of lying (it is correct about what is required for lying), it is not taken to be 
an accurate definition, because meeting the conditions stated in (CD) is not sufficient for a 
statement to qualify as a lie.  
This criticism of the classic definition is grounded: there are indeed statements that are 
believed to be false and are not lies. Believed-false statements that are not lies include ironic 
statements; fictional statements (e.g. uttered on stage or written in a fictional novel); jokes; 
teasing remarks; hyperboles; metaphors; euphemisms; and so forth. These kinds of 
statements, that I will call non-assertoric falsehoods, represent solid counterexamples to the 
classic definition: they meet (CD), but intuitively are not lies.  
To see this, let us consider an example of non-assertoric falsehood, a fictional statement. 
Imagine that an actor on stage utters: 
 
(1) I am Ubu, Prince of Podolie, Duke of Courlande, Earldom of Sandomir, Margrave 
of Thorn 
 
The actor is saying something that he believes to be false, but he is clearly not lying – he is 
just pretending to be Ubu for the sake of the play. Since the classic definition has no 
resources to rule out these cases, it must be incorrect. To be sure, this is quite an important 
failure: it means that the definition gives incorrect verdicts in a very wide variety of cases, 
involving virtually every figure of speech that can be literally false. 
Upon the failure of the classic definition, there are essentially two strains of definitions that 
are able to solve this problem and distinguish between lies and other non-assertoric 
falsehoods as non-lies: deceptionist definitions and non-deceptionist, assertion-based 
definitions. Deceptionist definitions expand (CD) by introducing the further condition that 
the speaker must intend to deceive his audience. This amendment deals with non-assertoric 
falsehoods by excluding them in virtue of the fact that they are not intended to deceive. For 
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instance, the actor’s utterance that (1) is not counted as a lie, because the actor is not 
attempting to deceive his audience. Broadly, deceptionist definitions 14  are phrased as 
follows: 
 
Deceptionist definitions: 
S lies to A iff: 
(a) S states that p 
(b) S believes ¬p 
(c) S intends A to believe p  
 
In recent years, there has been growing consensus that these definitions are incorrect. Their 
key problem is that the ‘intention to deceive condition’ (c) exposes the definition to several 
counterexamples (that will be discussed extensively in the next chapter).  
Are there alternative ways to amend the classic definition? The most influential alternative 
is to require that the speaker genuinely asserts that p. This amendment deals with non-
assertoric falsehoods by excluding them in virtue of the fact that they are not genuinely 
asserted. For instance, the actor’s utterance on stage does not count as a lie because the 
actor is not genuinely claiming that he is King Ubu, but merely pretending to claim for the 
sake of the play. Definitions that follow this strategy are dubbed non-deceptionist, because 
they reject the intention to deceive conditions, and assertion-based – because, unlike the 
classical definition (which is also non-deceptionist), they introduce the further requirement 
that the relevant proposition is asserted. More formally, assertion-based definitions read: 
 
Assertion-based (non-deceptionist) definitions: 
S lies to A iff:  
(a) S says p 
(b) S believes ¬p 
(c’) S asserts that p  
 
In sum, the contemporary debate on the definition of lying articulates around  
which putative additional condition is required to amend the classic definition of lying: 
some authors believe that the speaker has to intend to deceive the audience, other that he 
has to genuinely assert the relevant proposition. Chapter II will deal with the deceptionist 
                                                 
14 This label can itself be deceptive, as it may be interpreted as suggesting that these accounts require 
successful deception. Only intended deception is required: “deceptionist” should be taken to be a 
shorthand for “based on the intent to deceive condition”. 
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accounts, and Chapter III will discuss their most prominent alternative, assertion-based 
accounts. 
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IV. Insincerity 
 
 
Sincerity is often valued as an important virtue, and insincerity criticised as a vice. We 
generally trust other people to be sincere, and their testimony is a fundamental source of 
information without which we could hardly get on with our ordinary lives. For these reasons, 
insincerity has elicited the interest of philosophers working not only on language, but also 
on ethics and epistemology. Any epistemological or ethical discussion of insincerity, 
however, presupposes settlement of one fundamental question: what is it to be insincere? 
This chapter is devoted to answering this question. More specifically, it is concerned with 
two related aims. Its primary aim is to provide an analysis of insincerity as a component of 
lying. In other words, the primary goal of this chapter is to refine the insincerity condition 
in the definition of lying, specifically in the light of some counterexamples to which the 
traditional definition falls victim, including the third speech-act theoretic puzzle introduced 
in the previous chapter. But even if it is the interest in lying that drives this enquiry, my 
analysis of insincerity as a necessary condition for lying arguably retains value also as an 
analysis of insincerity in general. My related, secondary aim is thus to provide a 
characterisation of insincerity that (at least to some extent) applies also outside the debate 
on defining lying. 
This chapter is divided in four long53 sections. The first one simply lays out the problem of 
defining insincerity, and clarifies more accurately which notion of insincerity I am after. In 
section 2, I attack the only-belief view, namely the idea that beliefs are the only attitude that 
is relevant to determining whether an utterance is a lie. As I have argued in the previous 
chapter, this account of the insincerity condition for lying is inaccurate: for instance, a 
promise can be a lie when the speaker does not intend to perform the promised action. I 
consequently expand the insincerity condition to attitudes other than belief, thereby solving 
the last of my three speech-act theoretic puzzles. In the section 3 I test my revised condition 
empirically, showing that ordinary speakers share the intuition that also intentions can 
determine whether an utterance is a lie. 
                                                 
53 The longer sections in this chapter are based on material that I have already published elsewhere. 
Section 2 draws on Marsili (2016); section 3 is an almost literal excerpt from the same paper. Section 
4 is based on material from two different papers, Marsili (2014) and Marsili (2017). 
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Section 4 criticises the ‘dichotomic view’ of insincerity, namely the idea that either a 
statement is believed to be true, or believed to be false. It introduces lies that fall outside 
this dichotomy, namely fuzzy-lies and graded-belief lies, and develops a refined insincerity 
condition that treat these graded lies correctly: broadly, a speaker is insincere if he believes 
his statement to be more likely to be false than true. The final, fifth section brings together 
all my findings into a general account of the insincerity conditions for lying.  
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1. INSINCERITY: A PRELIMINARY ACCOUNT 
 
In ordinary language, the terms ‘sincere’ and ‘insincere’ are used in different contexts with 
different meanings. Before initiating a more thorough discussion of insincerity, I would like 
to clear up some ambiguities about these different meanings, to explain exactly which 
notion of insincerity this chapter aims at analysing. 
First, in ordinary language insincerity need not refer to linguistic utterances. We can say 
that a smile, or even person (as opposed to an utterance) is insincere. While these uses of 
the term are certainly appropriate, they are not the object of our interest here. This thesis 
is concerned with insincere utterances and more specifically assertions, and consequently 
only with linguistic insincerity. 
Second, even when we limit our analysis to linguistic insincerity, it seems that this term can 
be used at least in two ways54. In a broad sense, calling an utterance insincere is describing 
it as deceptive, or aimed at deceiving. For instance, Bernard Williams (2002: 74) defines 
insincere assertions as those that “have the aim of misinforming the hearer”. Under this 
conception, an insincere assertion is one intended to deceive: not only lies, but also 
misleading but literally true statements, omissions, and any sort of deceptive statement. 
This is not the conception of insincerity I am concerned with, for at least two reasons. First, 
I have already stated that I am after a notion of insincerity that, paired with a notion of 
assertion, will provide us with all the notions required for defining of lying. Understanding 
‘insincere’ as synonymous to ‘deceptive’ or ‘intended to deceive’ would not help in this 
enterprise: it would not allow for a distinction between lying and merely misleading (cf. 
A.1.2), and it would conflate the insincerity condition for lying with the intention to deceive 
condition. Second, on this conception the analysis of “S was insincere (in saying p)” would 
be equivalent with the analysis “S was deceptive (in saying p)”. Between a notion that 
overlaps with another and one that does not, the latter is clearly more appealing, as it 
enriches our conceptual toolbox in a way that the former does not. 
The sense of insincerity in which I am concerned is then a different one. Under this 
conception, insincerity indicates a discrepancy between the psychological state of the 
speaker (e.g. believing, intending, desiring) and the psychological state expressed by his 
speech act (e.g. asserting, promising, requiring). Defining ‘insincerity’ amounts to defining 
the nature of this discrepancy, which will be the subject of this chapter.  
                                                 
54 For a review of different conceptions of insincerity, cf. Eriksson (2011). 
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Finally, insincerity is a complex phenomenon, and there are several philosophical problems 
that concern this notion, more than this chapter could potentially discuss and analyse. In 
particular, here I will focus on two problems that have been rarely, if ever, discussed in the 
literature: how a definition of lying can deal with attitudes other than belief, and with graded 
insincerity. To focus on these relatively new problems, I will leave aside some classic ones. 
One in particular will be not be discussed in detail: that of differentiating between insincerity 
on the one hand, and misspeaking and self-deception on the other. I have briefly addressed 
this problem in A.1.2, where I argued this distinction can be made explicit just by specifying 
that the speaker has to satisfy (any version of) the insincerity condition deliberately. In order 
to focus on other issues, I will leave further philosophical problems concerning misspeaking 
and self-deception aside55.  
 
  
                                                 
55 In a recent paper, Jessica Pepp (forthcoming) mentions some further difficulties that may arise in 
this respect (cf. also Chan & Kahane 2011, Stokke 2014). Considering that Pepp’s problems seem 
to emerge from problems affecting theories of reference in general rather than insincerity in 
particular, and given that this chapter is concerned with problems that are distinctive of defining 
lying, I will leave the discussion of these subtle counterexamples for another time. 
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2. BEYOND BELIEF: INSINCERITY AND ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS  
 
In the previous chapter, I have mentioned that there seems to be universal agreement in 
the literature on lying that whether an utterance is a lie, and therefore insincere, is only a 
matter of what the speaker believes.  I called this view, that is endorsed by virtually every 
author in the literature, the ‘only-belief’ view of the insincerity condition for lying.  
  
ONLY-BELIEF:  the only attitude (or lack thereof) relevant to determine whether an 
utterance is a lie is belief 
 
In III.2.3, I have argued that this view is wrong. I will now readdress such criticism more in 
detail, and show how the insincerity condition for lying can be expanded to other 
propositional attitudes (e.g. intentions, desires) in order to address this objection. I will 
develop an alternative account of what it is for a speech act to be sincere or insincere, and 
then put it to work against counterexamples based on insincere promises. In the next 
section, I will show that this account better reflects ordinary speaker’s intuitions about what 
counts as a lie. 
 
2.1 The third speech act theoretic puzzle 
 
Let us start by briefly recapitulating the speech act theoretic puzzle introduced in III.2.3. 
The example is meant to show that there can be cases of lying in which the speaker believes 
that the propositional content of the utterance (identified in a non-descriptivist fashion) is 
true, and in which the speaker’s intentions, rather than his beliefs, are relevant to determine 
whether his utterance is a lie. 
 
UNFAITHFUL WIFE 
 Baba and Coco are a married couple. Baba is away from the city for work, and is planning 
to go out this night. Since Coco is extremely jealous, he asks her: “Will you be cheating on 
me tonight?”. Baba replies: 
 
(1) Do not worry Coco: I promise that I will not cheat on you tonight 
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In fact, Baba intends to do her best cheat on Coco at the party, but she is virtually certain 
that she will end up not doing so, as her terribly awkward manners have always prevented 
her from seducing any man other than Baba.  
 
In the example, Baba has an insincere intention, and her promise is deceptive: it seems 
intuitive that (1) is a lie. Nonetheless, the only-belief view incorrectly predicts that this is not 
a lie, because Baba is almost certain that she will not cheat on Coco. What is missing here 
is an intention (the intention to try to stick to the promise) rather than a belief. Against the 
predictions of traditional definitions, some utterances can be lies despite their content being 
believed to be true. 
To avoid this counterexample, a definition of lying should allow for propositional attitudes 
other than belief to determine whether one’s utterance is a lie. But how are we to extend 
the insincerity condition to other attitudes? Speech act theory offers a promising theoretical 
framework for this purpose: it is a standard view in speech act theory that insincerity can 
depend on a variety of attitudes, including beliefs, intentions and desires. 
 
2.2 Expressing attitudes and (in)sincerity 
 
Broadly put, speech act theorists take a speech act to be insincere whenever there is a 
mismatch between the attitude expressed by the utterance and the attitude possessed by the 
speaker (Falkenberg 1988:93).  Taken out of context, this definition is not very informative; 
in what follows, I will provide some theoretical background to flesh it out in a meaningful 
way. 
It is a standard view in speech act theory that each illocutionary act expresses a distinctive 
propositional attitude (Searle 1969, Bach & Harnish 1979).  The distinct attitude expressed 
by a given illocutionary act is part of what identifies it as opposed to others, and it is generally 
taken to define the point or purpose of the actions that we perform in uttering it. In this 
sense, we say that an assertion expresses a belief, that a promise expresses an intention, that 
asking someone for something expresses a desire. Philosophers and linguists have 
presented different taxonomies of illocutionary acts based, amongst other things, on the 
different psychological attitudes expressed by different (kinds of) illocutionary acts. Most 
authors would agree that the following characterisation is broadly56 correct: 
                                                 
56 It is debatable, for instance, whether a question or request always expresses a desire. For the 
purpose of the dissertation, however, we can leave this question aside. Independently of which 
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Attitudes expressed by specific illocutionary acts 
B-EX: If S asserts that p, S expresses (EX) the belief (B) that p 
D-EX: If S asks for p, S expresses a desire (D) for p 
I-EX: If S promises that p, S expresses the intention(I) to do p 
  
There are several ways to flesh out what is meant by ‘expressing’ a psychological state. I will 
assume that expressing an attitude does not entail having that attitude, so that you can 
insincerely express an attitude that you do not have (but cf. Davis 2003: 25, Green 2007:70-
83). Following a hint by Davidson (1985:88, cf. Marušić 2012:13, Fallis 2013), one could 
say that for a speaker to express a psychological state is for the speaker to represent himself 
as being in that psychological state. 
On an orthodox speech-act theoretic account of sincerity57, the sincerity condition for 
uttering a given illocutionary act is that the speaker has the psychological attitude expressed 
by that act:  
 
Sincere illocutionary acts 
SIN: The performance of an illocutionary act F(p) that expresses the psychological 
state Ψ(p) is sincere IFF in uttering F(p), S is in Ψ(p)  
  
From the orthodox account of sincerity, a simple account of insincerity can be derived: a 
speaker is insincere whenever he is not in the psychological state that is expressed by the 
illocutionary act performed: 
 
Insincere illocutionary acts 
INS:  The performance of an illocutionary act F(p) that expresses the psychological 
state Ψ(p) is insincere IFF in uttering F(p), S is not in Ψ(p)58 
  
                                                 
attitude a question expresses, what matters is that we can plug the correct characterisation of 
question into the general model that I am adopting. 
57 This view has been defended, under different guises, by Hare (1952:13,19–20,168–99), Searle 
(1969:60, 64–8), Wright (1992:14), Williams (1996:136), Moran (2005b), Green (2007:70-83).  
58 One might be wary of the chosen scope of the negation in INS, as we could that S is Ψ¬(p) rather 
than requiring that S is not in Ψ(p) In section 5, I will address this kind of worry, and present an 
alternative version of this condition. 
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This gives us a provisional, simple formulation of the insincerity conditions for the three 
illocutionary acts we are considering as examples:  
 
Insincerity conditions for specific illocutionary acts 
BIC: S asserts that p insincerely only if S does not believe that p 
DIC: S asks for p insincerely only if S does not desire p 
IIC: S promises that p insincerely only if S does not intend to p 
 
Importantly, an utterance can be insincere without being a lie. This is because an 
illocutionary act can be insincere without satisfying the assertion condition for lying. For 
instance, in asking you to do something that I do not desire, I may be insincere but I am 
not thereby lying. It should be thus kept in mind that this is a general account of insincerity, 
and that without a definition of assertion it does not alone provide us with sufficient 
conditions for defining lying.   
 
2.3 Insincerity conditions for promising 
 
Let us go back to the speech-act theoretic puzzle. The problem introduced by the 
UNFAITHFUL WIFE example is that there seem to be cases in which the speaker lies simply 
by lacking the intention to perform the promised action. In order to solve this puzzle, we 
need an alternative account of the insincerity conditions for lying. Since the proposed 
counterexample is about promising, to simplify this task I will start by developing an account 
for lying by promising. I will then show that this account generalises to every other 
illocutionary act that can be used to assert. 
At this stage, on the table there are only two competing ways of accounting for the insincerity 
conditions for lying by promising. The first is the approach traditionally used to define lying: 
the only-belief account. This approach applies indifferently the same insincerity conditions 
to every illocutionary act, and counts an utterance as insincere whenever its content is 
believed to be false. 
The second is the speech act theoretic account that I just introduced. According to this 
account, (i) a promise expresses an intention to Φ, and consequently (ii) the insincerity 
condition for promising is intending not to Φ. Assumption (i) can be traced back to Hume’s 
view (THN: 517-19) that a promise always expresses (and communicates) an intention to 
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perform the promised act59. Assumption (ii) is found in foundational works of speech act 
theory, like those of Austin (1962/1975:50, 135-6) and Searle (1965:243, 1969:60-2). I will 
refer to this account as the only-intention account. On this view, a promise is insincere only 
if, at the time of the utterance, the speaker does not intend to perform. 
A third account of the insincerity conditions for promising can be derived by combining 
the previous two, in the light of the relation of entailment between asserting and promising 
that I outlined in III.3.2. As a reminder, the performance of an illocutionary act F1(p) entails 
the performance of another illocutionary act F2(p) iff in the context of the utterance it is not 
possible for S to perform F1(p) without performing F2(p) – so that if S performs F1(p), S also 
performs F2(p). This relation of illocutionary entailment occurs between assertions and 
promises: one cannot promise to Φ without also performing an assertion that one will Φ, 
so that every time one promises to Φ one also asserts that one will Φ. To recycle my 
previous example, my explicit promise (2) illocutionarily entails the assertion that (2*), since 
I simply cannot promise that I will feed the brontosaurus without thereby also asserting that 
I will feed the brontosaurus: 
 
(2) I promise that  (2*) [I will feed the brontosaurus] 
 
How does this affect the insincerity conditions for promising? My conjecture is that if an 
assertion is always performed in addition to a promise, for the promise to be sincere the 
sincerity conditions for asserting need to be satisfied too. In other words, performing a 
sincere promise that Φ requires one both to intend Φ and to believe that one will Φ. This 
yields a novel account of the insincerity conditions for promising: 
 
Entailed-Insincerity condition:  
A promise is insincere if speaker intends not to Φ, or if the speaker believes that he 
will not Φ, or both 
 
                                                 
59 This view is extremely influential in the philosophical literature on the nature of social obligations. 
Many authors (sometimes referred to as ‘information-interest’ theorist) take promising’s main 
function to be informing the promisee of what the promisor is going to do (Sidgwick 1981:442–44, 
Anscombe 1981:18, Rawls 1981:345, Fried 1981:16, Foot 2011:45). This view has been opposed 
by Owens (2008:747-51). His arguments seem successful in establishing that in promising to Φ one 
does not necessarily communicate an intention to Φ, but it is less clear that they demonstrate that 
in promising to Φ one does not necessarily express an intention to Φ, or that sincerely promising 
does not require intending to Φ. 
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More specifically, a promise to Φ is insincere qua promise if the speaker intends not to Φ, 
and insincere qua assertion if the speaker believes that he will not Φ. This view (be it correct 
or not) can clearly be generalised: whenever there is illocutionary entailment, and two 
illocutionary acts are performed, the sincerity conditions of both acts apply. To sum up, 
the three candidate insincerity conditions for lying by promising are: 
 
Candidate insincerity conditions for promising: 
(BIC): Belief insincerity condition: S believes that S will not Φ 
(IIC): Intention insincerity condition: S intends not to Φ 
(EIC): Entailed insincerity condition: BIC ⋁ IIC 
 
Which account is preferable? The Moorean test for insincerity provides some linguistic 
data that prima facie favours the entailed-insincerity view over the other two. It is well known 
that assertions followed by the negation of their sincerity condition give rise to Moorean 
absurdities (Moore 1993:210): asserting “p and I don’t believe it” is incoherent in some 
distinctive way. One way of explaining this incoherence is that in uttering these sentences, 
the speaker performs a speech act and then blatantly violates one condition for its felicitous 
(in this case, sincere) performance, eventually failing to assert that p (Vanderveken 1980, 
Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 150-52). If both BIC and IIC are insincerity conditions for 
promising, it seems that they should both give rise to the same kind of unsuccessful 
incoherence (cf. Marušić 2012:14). As a matter of fact, sentences like (2¬B) and (2¬I) 
display this kind of absurdity: 
 
(2¬B) I promise that I will pick you up at 6, but I don’t believe I will pick you up at 6 # 
(2¬I) I promise that I will pick you up at 6, but I don’t intend to pick you up at 6 # 
 
In both cases, the utterance strikes one as incoherent, and in both cases, it is difficult to 
imagine that the speaker will be taken to have promised to pick his interlocutor up at 6. 
This linguistic data supports EIC, and cannot be easily explained by BIC or IIC taken 
separately. 
More importantly, only the EIC seems to make the right predictions in cases in belief and 
intention come apart, as in UNFAITHFUL WIFE. In UNFAITHFUL WIFE, Baba has a sincere 
belief that she will end up sticking to her promise (1), but an insincere intention to do 
whatever is in her power to break it. 
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(1) Do not worry Coco: I promise that I will not cheat on you tonight 
 
While the only-belief condition BIC makes the incorrect prediction in this case, the only-
intention condition IIC and entailed insincerity condition EIC correctly count (1) as a lie. 
The latter two conditions are thus preferable. But unlike IIC, EIC makes the correct 
predictions also when belief and intention diverge in the opposite way, i.e.  when the 
speaker intends to do his best to stick to his promise, but believes he will end up violating 
it nonetheless. To see this, let us consider another example: 
 
UNRELIABLE MECHANIC 
Baba has broken her car, but she needs it to visit her family next week. For this reason, 
Baba has called Coco the mechanic to repair it. Coco the mechanic checks the car 
and tells Baba:  
 
(3) Do not worry Baba: I promise that I will repair your car by next week 
 
Coco intends to repair the car and he will attempt to do it, but he is almost certain that 
he won’t manage to repair it in the end, because the damage is too serious.  
 
In this example, Coco the mechanic promises to repair the car even if he knows that he 
will almost certainly fail to repair it: intuitively, (3) is a lie. In this case, the only-intention 
condition IIC is not able to track this intuition; whereas both the entailed-insincerity 
condition EIC and the only-belief condition BIC, correctly predicts that (3) is a lie. 
Cases like UNFAITHFUL WIFE and UNRELIABLE MECHANIC support the conjecture that 
EIC is a better account of the insincerity conditions than BIC and IIC taken separately. 
Arguably, these cases are not straightforward, or prototypical, cases of lying. But this is also 
a prediction of the entailed-insincerity account: (3) is insincere qua assertion, but not 
insincere qua promise. Coco the mechanic intends to fulfil the promise, following one 
sincerity condition, but he believes he will almost surely fail, violating the other. By contrast, 
(1) is insincere qua promise, but not qua assertion. Baba intends to do her best to break 
the promise, violating one sincerity condition, but she believes that despite her efforts she 
will end up violating it, thereby following the other.  
All in all, it seems that there are solid reasons to prefer the entailed-insincerity account of 
promising. So far, only Marušić (2013) has defended a similar view (Austin 1961:239 
merely hints at this idea). However, Marušić also suggests that a promise that violates BIC 
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but not IIC might be better described as irrational rather than insincere. This is true if one 
endorses a ‘cognitivist view’, contending that it is irrational to intend to do something you 
believe that you will not do, so that only utterances satisfying both BIC and IIC (or neither 
of them) are rational, while utterances like (3) are irrational rather than insincere. 
Marušić’s observation points out a possible problem for the proposed account: if a rational 
intention to Φ requires believing that one will Φ, then there is no need to require both IIC 
and BIC, as the satisfaction of the first entails the satisfaction of the second in every case in 
which the speaker is rational. I will not discuss this objection here; however, in Marsili 
(2016) I have argued that (as long as you take it as a live possibility that you will Φ – i.e. as 
long as you are not certain that you will not Φ) you can rationally intend to Φ and believe 
that you will very likely not Φ (or vice versa). On this weak cognitivist view, Marušić’s 
observation is not a worry: utterances like (3) are insincere rather than irrational, and EIC 
is preferable to the other accounts exactly because it successfully captures these peculiar 
forms of insincerity. In IV.3, I report empirical evidence showing that native English 
speakers judge that promises with contrasting intentions and beliefs are mendacious rather 
than irrational, and that they do not find the contrast between intention and belief involved 
in these cases to be problematic. 
 
2.4 A general account of the insincerity conditions for lying 
 
If my arguments are sound, it should be established at this point that EIC offers the best 
characterisation of the insincerity conditions for lying by promising. Pairing the EIC with 
the definition of lying developed in the previous chapter, we can obtain the following 
definition for lying by promising that p: 
 
Definition of lying by promising 
In successfully uttering a promise with content p, S lies to A about p iff:  
1. S thereby asserts that p 
2. Either S believes that not p, or S does not intend to p, or both 
 
Since promises by default entail assertions, condition (1) obtains by default: the informative 
bit is condition (2), that specifies under which conditions a promise is a lie. This definition 
can then be extended to other illocutionary acts that entail an assertion. We know from the 
general account of insincerity developed in the previous section that an illocutionary act 
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F(p) that expresses the psychological state Ψ(p) is insincere IFF in uttering F(p), S is not in 
Ψ(p). To generalise the definition of lying by promising to illocutionary acts other than 
assertion, we simply need to require that, when an illocutionary act other than assertion is 
preformed, either this insincerity condition is satisfied, or the insincerity condition for 
assertion, or both. In other words: 
 
Definition of lying by performing an illocutionary act 
In successfully uttering an illocutionary act with content p that expresses an attitude 
Ψ(p), S lies to A about p iff:  
1. S thereby asserts that p, i.e.: 
a) S expresses p 
b) S presents p as an actual state of affairs 
c) S takes responsibility for p being an actual state of affairs 
2. Either S believes that not p, or S is not in Ψ(p), or both  
 
This gives us a more accurate account of the conditions under which an illocutionary act 
other than assertion can count as lying. This definition is more accurate than the one 
developed in chapter III, as it generalises the insincerity conditions to attitudes other than 
beliefs. But does this definition really reflect our ordinary intuitions about lying? In what 
follows, I present evidence for a positive response to this question. 
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3. INSINCERE PROMISES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
3.1 Testing folk intuitions about lying 
 
In the philosophical literature, it is generally agreed that a good definition of lying should 
track the ordinary usage of the term (Carson 2006:285; Fallis 2009:32): most debaters are 
after a characterisation of lying that is in line with the linguistic practice of competent 
speakers. A good account of lying should predict which usages of the term are correct and 
incorrect according to competent speakers. A corollary of this way of thinking is that if an 
account of lying makes predictions that are inconsistent with ordinary people’s intuitions, 
that account fails to meet one important desideratum of a theory of lying. With this in mind, 
philosophers and linguists have started to accumulate data about ordinary speakers’ 
intuitions about the correct usage of the terms. These studies have the potential to give us 
insight into what lying is, or at the very least into what lying is perceived to be within a 
community of speakers60. 
Numerous and diverse empirical studies, stemming from different theoretical backgrounds 
and motivated by different explanatory aims, have attempted to explore folk intuitions 
about lying61. Among the ones explicitly investigating the intuitions of competent speakers 
about the concept of lying, the most important strand comes from the framework of 
prototype semantics. Following the lead of Coleman & Kay (1981), these studies attempt 
to identify the features of a prototypical lie, and to outline the differences of these 
prototypes across different cultures (Sweetster 1987, Cole 1996, Hardin 2010, Rong, 
Chunmei & Lin 2013). The present study addresses similar worries, but in a slightly 
different framework, namely that of experimental philosophy. Here, the aim of the analysis 
is to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an utterance to be a lie, rather than 
the prototypical features that make up the concept. Only a few studies on lying have been 
conducted within this framework so far, some attempting to test if the intention to deceive 
is necessary for lying (Arico & Fallis 2013, Meibauer 2016, Rutschmann, R., & Wiegmann, 
A. 2017), and others if actual falsity is (Turri & Turri 2015, Wiegmann et al. 2016). The 
                                                 
60 For a more detailed defence of the importance of tracking ordinary intuitions for a definition of 
lying, see Fallis (2009) and Arico & Fallis (2012:794-7) 
61 Here I am only considering studies on competent speakers. For a broader a review, including 
studies in developmental psychology, see Hardin (forth.). 
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present experimental study will instead try to establish which conditions are necessary for 
lying by promising. 
 
3.2 Aim of the study 
 
This experimental study aims to test the theories developed in section 2 against the 
intuitions of native English speakers. This means that it will attempt to determine if ordinary 
people rate illocutionary acts other than assertions as lies, and 
which insincerity conditions have to be satisfied for them to do so. More specifically, this 
study will be concerned with one speech act in particular, namely promises. The main 
reason is that promises clearly display all of the speech-act theoretic puzzles introduced in 
chapter III: they can be performed by means of an explicit performative, they are not 
assertions, and their insincerity conditions are sensitive to attitudes other than belief 
(namely intentions). As a reminder, in the previous section I have introduced three 
candidate insincerity conditions for promises: BIC IIC or EIC:  
 
Candidate insincerity conditions for promising 
IIC: the speaker does not intend to Φ 
BIC: the speaker does not believe that he will Φ 
EIC: either the speaker does not believe that he will Φ, or does not intend to Φ, or 
both 
 
Testing that illocutionary acts other than assertions are judged to be lies is relatively simple: 
it is sufficient to create a story in which it seems that a character lies by promising, and ask 
participants whether the character has lied. If participants classify promises as lies, we have 
evidence that not only assertions are classified as lies. Testing which insincerity condition is 
more accurate is a slightly more complex matter. Here we need different stories in which 
different combinations of insincerity conditions are violated, and for each story test whether 
the participants believe that the speaker has lied. Given our candidate insincerity 
conditions, we will need to consider three scenarios in which a character promises 
something insincerely. In the straightforward scenario, the character’s (S) utterance satisfies 
both BIC and IIC. In the no-intention scenario, it satisfies IIC but not BIC. In the no-belief 
scenario, it satisfies BIC but not IIC. I will refer to the latter two cases as the crucial 
conditions, as opposed to the control (straightforward) conditions. 
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• Straightforward scenario: BIC & IIC [CONTROL] 
• No-intention scenario: IIC & ¬BIC  [CRUCIAL] 
• No-belief scenario: BIC & ¬IIC  [CRUCIAL] 
 
3.3 The predictions of existing theories 
 
In section 2 I have mentioned five approaches to lying by explicit promising. Each account 
gives different predictions about which of the three scenarios will be rated as a lie. 
 
1. According to the only-assertion paradigm (), lying requires a direct assertion. Its 
prediction is that since promises are not direct assertions, respondents will claim that in 
no scenario is the character lying. Interestingly, if this view is correct, the first two speech-
act theoretic puzzles are not really a worry for defining lying: since only direct assertions 
can count as lies, there is no issue of determining whether explicit performatives can count 
as lies, and under which conditions. 
2. The only-belief paradigm (BIC) rigidly assumes that you lie only if you believe that the 
propositional content of your speech act is false. This view expects positive responses in 
the straightforward and in the no-belief condition, but negative responses in the no-
intention condition. If this view is correct, the third speech act theoretic puzzle about 
insincerity is not really a worry for defining lying: since only beliefs are relevant to 
determine whether an utterance is a lie, there is no issue of extending the insincerity 
conditions to other attitudes. 
3. The only-intention paradigm (IIC) maintains that a promise is insincere iff the speaker 
does not intend to fulfil his promise. Applied to lying, this view predicts that a promise is 
a lie iff the speaker does not intend to fulfil it. The straightforward and no-intention cases 
should then be rated as lies, but not the no-belief case.  
4. According to a cognitivist interpretation (BIC & IIC), the no-intention and no-belief 
should be described as cases of irrational thinking rather than lying, so that only the 
straightforward case should be rated as a lie. 
5. According to the entailed-assertion paradigm (BIC ⋁ IIC), a promise is a lie either if the 
speaker does not intend to fulfil his obligation, or if he believes that he will fail to fulfil it, 
or both. The account also predicts that all scenarios will be rated as lies, but expects the 
straightforward one to receive slightly higher ratings than the crucial ones. 
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  STRAIGHTFORWARD  NO INTENTION NO BEL 
ONLY-ASSERTION NO NO NO 
ONLY-BELIEF YES NO YES 
ONLY-INTENTION YES YES NO 
COGNITIVIST YES NO (IRR) NO (IRR) 
ENTAILED-ASSERTION  YES YES (-) YES (-) 
 
Table 1: the predictions of the five different accounts of lying by promising 
 
3.4 Experiment 1 
 
3.4.1 Method 
 
Participants: Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested using 
Qualtrics. They were compensated $0.2 for taking the survey. Repeated participation was 
prevented. Overall, 166 U.S. residents were tested (85 females; mean age (SD) = 36.6 years 
(12.9); range: 18–72; 100% reporting English as a native language). To prevent participants 
from taking the test negligently, a minimum response time (25 seconds) and a control 
question were set. Data from three participants who failed to meet these conditions were 
excluded, but including them would not affect the results. 
Design: Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Each condition 
features Coco and Baba, and in each condition Coco promises something to Baba. The 
first two conditions [(1) straightforward lie; (2) no intention] belong to the ‘drink’ story, and 
the second two conditions [(3) straightforward lie; (4) no belief] belong to the ‘repair’ story. 
In the ‘drink’ story, Coco promises not to drink; in the ‘repair’ story, Coco promises to 
repair Baba's car. For each pair, in the straightforward condition Coco lacks both intention 
and belief, and in the crucial case he lacks one attitude (intention in 2, belief in 4) but not 
the other. 
Having been assigned to one of the conditions and having read the relevant story, the 
participants were posed two questions, always in the same order. The first asked whether 
Coco told a lie (“Did Coco tell a lie”? Y/N). The second allowed participants to report 
whether they felt uneasy in answering the preceding question (“Did you find it easy to make 
a decision”? Y/N); those answering “no” were solicited to motivate their uneasiness via a 
simple feedback form. The second question was especially designed to rule out the 
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possibility that participants would have preferred not to give a dichotomic yes-no response, 
but also to collect qualitative data about the strength of the participants' intuitions. 
Some peculiarities of the design are due to consistency constraints on the rationality of 
“intending without believing”, and vice versa (cf. Appendix II). The first peculiarity is that 
in all conditions Coco has a partial rather than outright belief in whether he will fulfil his 
promise. This is due to the adoption of weak cognitivism in this research, according to 
which intending to Φ entails not being certain that you will fail to Φ. To grant uniformity 
between all conditions, Coco has a partial belief both in the crucial cases (where it could 
not be otherwise) and in the straightforward ones.  Similar consistency constraints (also 
discussed in Appendix II) motivated one asymmetry in the experimental design, i.e. the 
fact that the no-intention and no-belief cases were not tested within the same story. The 
reason is that an uncontroversial no-intention case demands a promise about refraining 
from acting, while an uncontroversial no-belief case demands a promise about actively 
performing one action. 
  
3.4.2 Results and discussion 
 
Virtually every respondent rated the straightforward cases (in which Coco lacks both belief 
and intention to perform) as lies: 95% of the participants claimed that Coco lied in the 
drink-straightforward condition (38 of 40) and 95% in the repair-straightforward condition 
(39 of 41). All except one participant (in the drink scenario) declared that the question was 
easy to answer. The results for the straightforward cases support the view that it is possible 
to lie by explicit promising, refuting the only assertion hypothesis. They also back the 
stronger claim that insincere promises can be regarded as prototypical cases of lying; and 
that, more generally, a prototypical lie can be performed by uttering a speech act other than 
assertion.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of respondents rating the protagonist’s utterance as a lie in each condition.  
 
In the no-intention condition, 90% of the participants (40 of 44) rated the promise as a lie. 
This refutes the predictions of the only-belief and of the cognitivist accounts, as respondents 
classed the promise as a lie even if Coco sincerely believes that he will (almost certainly) 
fulfil his promise. The difference between this condition and the corresponding drink-
straightforward case was not significant, χ2(1, N = 84) = .53, p = .467; nonetheless, as much 
as 14% of the participants (6 of 44) declared that the question was not easy to answer, which 
is significantly more than in the straightforward conditions (Fisher's Exact Test, N = 125, p 
= .008, two tails).  This shows that intuitions in this condition are not as strong as in the 
straightforward cases, and suggests that the no-intention condition is regarded by some 
participants as a non-paradigmatic instance of lying.  
The no-belief condition was rated as a lie by 73% of the participants (30 of 41). A binomial 
test showed that this result is significantly different to a chance distribution of the responses 
(p = .004, two tails); in other words, participants were more likely to say that the promise 
was a lie than the opposite (OR = 2.73), which logically entails that the only-intention 
account (according to which this case does not qualify as lying) can also be rejected. In this 
condition, 15% of the participants (6 of 41) declared that the question was difficult to 
answer: Fisher’s Exact Test revealed that this was significantly different from the 
straightforward cases (p = .006, two tails, OR = 13.71), suggesting that at least some 
participants did not see this as a paradigmatic case of lying. That the case might not be seen 
as prototypical is also confirmed by the lower percentage of ratings of the promise as a lie: 
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this case differs significantly from all the rest of the cases jointly, χ2(1, N = 166) = 12.71, p 
= .001, as well as from the no-intention case separately, χ2(1, N = 85) = 4.6, p = .032. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of respondents rating the question as difficult to answer (scale from 0% to 
50%). 
 
Interestingly, none of the feedback forms filled in by the participants who found it difficult 
to answer the question mentions the contrast between intention and belief as problematic, 
suggesting that the cognitivist account of intentions does not reflect the participants’ 
intuition. Logistic regression was used to test whether information about gender or age 
could be used to predict the responses, revealing that neither gender (p = .592) nor age (p 
= .808) was a significant predictor.  
The results provide strong support for the definition of lying by promising elaborated in 
part A. However, one can still worry that the dichotomous yes/no design led some 
participants to polarize their responses in an unnatural way (cf. Xu, Lu, Fuo & Lee 
2009:318, Turri & Turri 2015:163). In section 3 we have seen that beliefs, and hence 
insincerity, can come in degrees, and that contrasting parameters can influence our 
evaluation of a statement as insincere. Perhaps participants see lying as a graded or vague 
concept (cf. IV.4 and Bazzanella 2009) and would have preferred to give a graded answer. 
In fact, 14% of the participants in the crucial cases (12 of 85) declared that the question was 
difficult to answer.  Maybe they gave a positive answer to sanction that the speaker 
misbehaved in some important way – but they would not have classed the utterance as a lie 
if an intermediate alternative was given. If this line of reasoning is correct, and the probes 
forced the participants to polarise their responses, the proposed interpretation might be 
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mistaken. To test this hypothesis, the test was rerun with a slightly modified design that 
allowed for graded rather than dichotomous responses. 
 
3.5 Experiment 2 
 
3.5.1 Method 
 
Participants: Participants were 104 adults (57 females; mean age (SD) = 37.1 years (11.8); 
range: 19-64; 100% reporting English as a native language, recruited and tested online as in 
Experiment 1). One participant failing to meet the minimum response time was excluded, 
but including him would have not affected the results. 
Design: The design was the same as Experiment 1, but instead of using a dichotomous 
yes/no measure, participants were asked to rate their agreement with the statement “Coco 
told Baba a lie” on a 7-point Likert scale (1: “definitely agree”, 4: “neither agree nor 
disagree”, 7: “definitely disagree”). If people had the intuition that the crucial conditions do 
not fully qualify as cases of lying, their ratings should concentrate around the midpoint (or 
below); if instead they shared the intuition that Coco is actually lying, the ratings should 
instead concentrate on the ‘lie’ end of the scale (5 or above).  
 
3.5.2 Results and discussion 
 
In the no-intention condition, participants overwhelmingly agreed that Coco did lie: 84% 
(21 out of 25) of them rated it as “5” or above, and only 16% (4 participants) as “4” or below 
(mean = 6.0; mode = “7”). Similarly, in the no-belief condition, participants overwhelmingly 
agreed that Coco did lie, 88% (22 out of 25) of them rating it as “5” or above and the 
remaining 12% (3 participants) rating it below “4” (mean = 5.8; mode = “7”). Like in the 
first experiment, the mean score in the ‘repair belief’ condition was slightly lower than in 
the ‘drink intention’ condition, but the difference (unlike in Experiment 1) was not 
significant, t(48) = 0.64, p = .523.  A comparison of the crucial and the straightforward cases 
revealed a significant difference between the two ‘repair’ scenarios, t(34.3) = 2.52, p = .017 
(equal variances not assumed), but no significant difference between the two ‘drink’ 
scenarios, t(49) = 0.58, p = .56262. Overall, these results are well in accordance with those 
                                                 
62  Note, however, that this comparison may have been somewhat distorted by the fact that 
the control drink scenario got lower scores than expected from a straightforward case. 
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obtained with the dichotomous design, strengthening the case for the entailed-assertion 
account.  
 
 
Figure 3: Pie charts showing the participants’ ratings in each of the four scenarios. 
 
A last worry to address is that participants might have agreed that Coco lied only because 
they were not allowed to categorise his statement in some alternative way that they found 
more adequate. Perhaps most had the intuition that in the crucial conditions Coco was 
deceptive, or insincere, and were led to describe him as lying only because no other 
category of assessment was offered. They agreed that Coco was lying because it was the only 
available option to express that he misbehaved, but they would have denied it if some 
alternative category more adequate to describe the situation, like being deceptive, was also 
available. To address this worry, a second study was conducted that provided participants 
with an opportunity to describe the speaker along two different categories: as being 
deceptive and as being lying63. 
 
3.6 Experiment 3 
 
3.6.1 Method 
 
                                                 
63 What if the participants preferred to describe the utterance as insincere rather than deceptive? 
There is a reason why “deceptive” was preferred to “insincere”. On all plausible understandings of 
these terms, being insincere entails being deceptive, while the opposite is not true.  The “deception” 
option is thus preferable, as it allows all participants to acknowledge that the protagonist misbehaved 
also if they think that “insincere” is a more accurate description (agreeing that the protagonist is 
insincere entails agreeing that he is deceptive). 
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Participants: Fifty-five new participants were tested (31 females, mean age (SD) = 34.6 years 
(12.5); range: 19–66; 100% reporting English as a native language, recruited and tested 
online as in the other experiments). Data from six participants failing to meet the minimum 
response time and/or the control question was excluded, but including them would have 
not affected the results. 
Design: Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two crucial conditions (no-belief, 
no-intention) from Experiment 1. They were then asked to answer two questions that 
appeared (in randomized order) on the same screen: 
 
 Did Coco say something deceptive? [Y/N] 
 Did Coco tell Baba a lie? [Y/N] 
 
Participants were then asked to answer the same control and demographic questions as in 
Experiment 1. 
In both of the vignettes used in the experiment, there is no question that Coco’s statement 
is deceptive: in the no-belief condition he pretends to have a belief he does not have; in the 
no-intention one, he pretends to have an intention that he does not have. Participants who 
had the intuition that Coco was not lying thus had the opportunity to deny that Coco is lying 
while being able to describe Coco as misbehaving, namely as being deceptive. 
Given that in both vignettes it is uncontroversial that Coco’s statement is deceptive, it is only 
the second question (about lying) that is of interest here. If the scores obtained in this 
experiment are significantly lower than those obtained in the same scenarios of Experiment 
1, then the proposed interpretation of the results might be unwarranted. By contrast, if 
participants continue to describe Coco as lying, there is even stronger experimental 
evidence in favour of the proposed view.  
 
3.6.2. Results 
 
The overwhelming majority of participants marked both the no-intention case (92%, 24 out 
of 26) and the no-belief case (90%, 26 out of 29) as a lie. The scores obtained in the crucial 
conditions in Experiment 3 are even higher than those obtained in Experiment 1, but 
neither of the across-experiment differences was significant (no-intention: χ2(1, N = 70) = 
2.89, p = .089.; no-belief: χ2(1, N = 70) = .04, p = .84). These results are consistent with the 
previous ones, and strengthen the case for the entailed-assertion view. Somewhat 
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surprisingly, the difference between the no-belief and the no-intention condition found in 
the previous experiments has disappeared, χ2(1, N = 55) = .12, p = .73.   
 
Figure 3: Percentage of respondents rating the protagonist’s utterance as a lie and as deceptive. 
 
 
3.7 General discussion 
 
The results of all experiments strongly support the entailed-assertion account. They 
consistently show that it offers the best predictions of people’s intuitions about lying by 
promising. A promise is a lie iff the speaker lacks belief or intention to fulfil the promise, 
or both. Furthermore, these results undermine all alternative views: the only-assertion view 
that only assertions can count as lies, the only-belief view that believing that what you say is 
false is necessary for lying, and the only-intention view that a promise is a lie only if the 
speaker does not intend to perform. In doing so, they also confirm the significance of the 
speech-act theoretic puzzles about lying, as these puzzles are directed at criticising both the 
only-assertion and only-belief view about lying.  
In Experiment 1 and 2, the crucial conditions obtained lower scores than the control 
conditions (Experiment 3 had no control conditions), and in Experiment 1 around one in 
six participants declared that they found it difficult to decide whether to classify them as 
lies. In line with the prediction of the entailed-assertion view, this suggests that the consensus 
is less pronounced when only one of the two sincerity conditions for promising is violated, 
and that a portion of the population sees them as non-paradigmatic instances of lying. 
 
3.8. More on the results 
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3.8.1 Intentions vs Beliefs 
 
The crucial conditions got different results in Experiment 1: the no-intention condition got 
significantly higher rates than the no-belief one. A slighter difference between them was also 
found in Experiment 2. This kind of difference, however, was not found in Experiment 3, 
or in the second question of Experiment 1 (about the participants’ uneasiness to define 
Coco’s utterance as a lie). Perhaps the difference is due to random fluctuations in the 
subjects’ intuitions, and does not require an explanation. But if an explanation must be 
given, it can be given in terms of moral judgements. 
Several authors have suggested that lying is a morally loaded term (Bok 1978:14, Williams 
1985:140), and some of them even contended that white lies are not lies (Margolis 1962, 
Donagan 1977:89, Grotius, RWP:1212-8). A plausible view is that moral judgements might 
affect whether one finds a particular case of lying more or less prototypical. Experimental 
studies have also shown that judgements about intentions (Knobe, 2003) and causation 
(Alicke 2014) can be influenced by judgements about culpability (i.e. moral judgements). 
If moral judgements can affect folk intuitions about whether a particular case is a lie, a moral 
asymmetry between the scenarios might have influenced the results. In fact, there is such 
an asymmetry between the no-intention and the no-belief cases. In the first case, Coco is 
fully responsible for not fulfilling the promise: it is in his power to fulfil it, but he willingly 
decides to infringe it. By contrast, in the no-belief case Coco intends to do what is in his 
power to fulfil the promise, but it is not fully in his power to do so. In other words, in the 
first case he is fully responsible for the infraction, while in the second he is only responsible 
for having set the stakes too high. 
While the no-intention case is by definition in ‘bad faith’, the no-belief case is by definition 
in ‘good faith’. This could explain the slight asymmetry in the results – an asymmetry also 
expected in any replication of the test, given that it is built into the difference between 
violating the ‘belief sincerity condition’ and violating the ‘intention sincerity condition’. 
 
3.8.2 The intention to deceive condition 
 
Proponents of the intention to deceive condition (IDC) for lying (cf. chapter II) might be 
worried that these results have been influenced by the fact that it has been left unspecified 
whether Coco intends to deceive Baba. For instance, the no-belief case might have received 
lower results in Experiment 1 because it is not clear whether Coco intends to deceive Baba. 
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In this section, I will show not only that this worry is unfounded, but that the results 
undermine the very idea that ordinary speakers take the IDC to be necessary for lying. 
On a standard interpretation (the “rigid” intention to deceive condition, or IDC2, cf. II.2.2), 
the relevant intention to deceive has to be about the content of the statement: if the content 
of the statement is p, the speaker has to intend to make the hearer believe that p. On a 
weaker version of the IDC (the “believed sincerity condition”, or BSC, cf. II.2.3), the 
relevant intention is just to make the hearer believe that the speaker believes that p. In other 
words, where p is the believed-false content of the speaker’s statement, the two most 
influential versions of IDC are: 
 
IDC2: S intends A to believe: (p) 
BSC: S intends A to believe: (S believes that p) 
 
In the no-belief condition, the content of the promise is that Coco will repair the car, a 
proposition that Coco believes to be very likely false. Now, unless Coco intends his promise 
not to be accepted, or not to be acted upon (i.e. if Coco’s promise is a normal promise), 
Coco clearly intends Baba to believe that he will repair the car, so the participants have no 
reason to believe that IDC does not obtain. 
In the no-intention condition, by contrast, the relevant content is that Coco will not drink. 
But here Coco believes the proposition to be probably true, so that neither IDC2 nor BSC 
can obtain, and the participants cannot think that they obtain. Two consequences can be 
drawn from this observation. The first one is that intuitions about the intention to deceive 
condition did not alter the result of the experiment: if they had some weight, they would 
have favoured the no-belief case over the no-intention one; instead, it was the latter that 
obtained significantly higher results. The second is that the high results from the no-
intention case (90% lies, showing no significant difference from the straightforward cases) 
strongly suggest that neither IDC2 nor BSC is perceived as a necessary condition for lying.  
Here is a reply. Even if neither IDC1 nor BSC are satisfied in the no-intention case, Coco 
is still aiming to deceive, since he clearly intends Baba to believe that he intends not to 
drink. The problem with this response is that it relies on a problematic definition of 
‘intention to deceive’ (paralleling the “broad” intention to deceive condition, or IDC1, from 
II.2.1) according to which there are no constraints on what the deception is about: 
 
IDC1: S intends to deceive A 
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The problem with the IDC1 is that we have already seen that it is untenable, because it 
counts any deceptive believed-false statement as a lie, even if deception has nothing to do 
with the content of the statement. It seems that the IDC should instead only capture 
deceptive intents that are somehow related to what is said by the liar. As a matter of fact, 
there are known counterexample to IDC1, as the THEATRICAL POSE counterexample by 
Fallis (2010:6) (cf. II.2.1). 
To be able to defend the claim that Coco is lying in the no-belief case, the proponent of 
the IDC has to provide a different version of the IDC – perhaps one that is sensitive to the 
different attitudes expressed by a speech act, such as IDC4: 
 
IDC4: S intends A to believe that (S Ψ(p)), 
 
where Ψ is the propositional attitude expressed by the illocutionary act with content p that 
S has performed. 
To conclude, the experiment represents a challenge to the existing versions of the IDC, 
and suggests a further challenge for their proponents: that of constraining the content of 
attempted deception in a way that generalises across different illocutionary acts. 
 
3.8.3 Falsity condition 
 
In the literature on lying, virtually every author accepts a ‘subjective’ account of lying, 
according to which asserting an objectively false proposition is not necessary for lying, as 
long as the speaker believes that proposition to be false (cf. 1.1.2). However, a few authors 
(Grotius RWP:1209, Benton forth) have suggested that falsity of the statement, in addition 
to belief in its falsity, is required for lying – call this the objective view. Recently, Turri & 
Turri (2015) claimed to have found experimental evidence that most laypeople endorse 
the objective view. However, their study is far from convincing, and has recently been 
dismissed by Wiegmann et al. (2016). An interesting aspect of the present study is that it 
puts further pressure on the objective view of lying, and on Turri & Turri’s claim that such 
view reflects laypeople’s intuitions. 
How does the present study relate to this debate? A first suggestion is that if participants 
regarded falsity as necessary for lying, they would not have rated a promise as a lie unless 
the promise was actually infringed in the story. However, in all conditions of all experiments 
participants agreed that the protagonist lied, even if it is always left unspecified whether the 
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promise was fulfilled or not, i.e. if it was objectively false64. This seems incompatible with 
the fact that all respondents in the straightforward conditions, and the majority in the others, 
indicated that Coco lied. Moreover, in the straightforward cases, 99% of the participants 
reported that they found it easy to respond. How could this be, if they did not know whether 
the falsity condition obtained? 
One easy response is that in all four cases the respondents predicted that, given the 
information available, the promise would eventually be infringed in the story: they took it 
that it was ‘implicit’ that the falsity condition would obtain. This is clearly plausible for the 
straightforward conditions: since Coco intends not to do what he promised, and believes 
that very probably he will succeed in not doing it, the falsity condition will almost surely be 
met. A similar inference is plausible in the no-belief condition: even if Coco intends to 
repair the car, he believes that very likely he will not succeed, and this clearly suggests that 
the car will not be repaired. 
The real problem for proponents of the falsity condition is the no-intention case: here, 
Coco intends to drink against his promise, but he believes that he will very likely fail to do 
so, because he will not be able to. The information provided in the scenario cannot license 
the inference to the conclusion that he will drink; as a matter of fact, it only licenses the 
opposite inference. In other words, not only it is not specified if the falsity condition obtains, 
but the scenario clearly suggests that it will not obtain. In all experiments, the no-intention 
condition was consistently rated as a lie (obtaining even higher scores than the other crucial 
condition), and in no experiment its results were significantly different to the straightforward 
scenarios: this strongly suggests that participants did not take falsity of the promise to be 
necessary for lying. 
                                                 
64 What do we mean exactly by saying that such a promise about a future state of affairs can be false? 
No straightforward response can be offered in our case, because promises are about future 
contingents (at the moment in which a promise is uttered, it is still indeterminate whether the 
promisor will fulfil it: in some possible futures he does, in others he does not) and semanticists 
disagree about how to determine the truth-conditions of statements about future contingents. The 
fact that we are considering a promise rather than an assertion further complicates the issue. 
However, for our purposes it is sufficient to point out that no plausible account is able to predict 
that the falsity condition is met in the no-intention case. Having noted that, it is worth offering a 
sketch of how a plausible characterisation of the falsity condition for promising could look like. The 
following is broadly inspired on Belnap’s (2000) account of the truth conditions for promising that 
Φ: 
The falsity condition for promising that Φ is met at the moment of the utterance mU and at the 
relevant moment mR (mR  mU) iff it is a settled matter at mR that Φ was false at mU. 
I am grateful to Francis Cockadoodledoo for having helped me to develop this point. 
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The experimental data collected thus strengthens the case for the subjective account. As 
already shown by Wiegmann et al., people think that lying does not require falsity after all65. 
 
3.9 Conclusions 
 
In the previous chapter, I have developed a speech-act theoretic framework to outline the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for lying by promising, and sketched a way to extend 
this account to other illocutionary acts performed by uttering a sentence containing an 
explicit performative. Assuming that an ‘assertion-based’ definition of lying is broadly 
correct, the proposed account takes a promise to be a lie under the following conditions: 
 
Definition of lying by promising 
In successfully uttering a promise with content p, S lies to A about p iff:  
1. S thereby asserts that p 
2. Either S believes that not p, or S does not intend to p, or both 
 
More generally, 
 
Speech-act theoretic definition of lying 
In successfully uttering an illocutionary act with content p that expresses an attitude 
Ψ(p), S lies to A about p iff:  
1. S thereby asserts that p, i.e.: 
a) S expresses p 
b) S presents p as an actual state of affairs 
c) S takes responsibility for p being an actual state of affairs 
2. Either S believes that not p, or S is not in Ψ(p), or both  
 
In introducing my speech act-theoretic definition of lying, I have put into question several 
ideas that are found in the literature: the view that only direct assertions can be lies; the view 
that the propositional content of a lie has to be believed to be false; the view a promise is 
insincere only if the speaker does not intend to perform; the view that falsity is required for 
lying. My experimental study has shown that, at least with respect to promises, the proposed 
                                                 
65 It should be stressed, however, that the experimental design of this study was not conceived 
specifically to test the falsity condition hypothesis. Even if the data collected supports the objective 
view, it provides weaker support than studies explicitly conceived to test this hypothesis, i.e. studies 
explicitly stated that the falsity condition did not obtain. 
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view (but none of the alternative ones) gives predictions that are consistent with folk 
intuitions about lying.  
Overall, it seems that my proposed definition offers a plausible account of the conditions 
under which the performance of an insincere speech act counts as a lying, that reflects 
ordinary people’s judgements about whether a given utterance is a lie. 
 
Appendix I – the scenarios 
 
Drink story - Refraining from action 
 
Baba and Coco are married. Coco is going to a party, but Baba does not like Coco to drink. So 
Baba asks him: “Will you be drinking alcohol at the party?”. Coco replies: “Do not worry Baba: I 
promise that I will not drink alcohol at the party.”  
 
Scenario 1 - Straightforward:  
In fact, Coco intends to drink alcohol at the party, and he is almost certain that he will find 
something to drink there.  
 
Scenario 2 - No intention (to refrain as promised): 
Coco actually intends to drink alcohol at the party and he will attempt to, but he is almost certain 
that he won’t succeed, since he believes that the hosts do not offer alcoholic drinks at their parties.  
 
Repair story - Positive action 
Baba has broken her car, but she needs it to visit her family next week. For this reason, Baba has 
called Coco the mechanic to repair it. Coco the mechanic checks the car and tells Baba: “Do not 
worry Baba: I promise that I will repair your car by next week.”  
 
Scenario 3 - Straightforward: 
Coco has no intention whatsoever to repair the car, and he is almost certain that he will not repair 
it.  
 
Scenario 4 - No belief: 
Coco intends to repair the car and he will attempt to do it, but he is almost certain that he won’t 
manage to repair it in the end, because the damage is too serious.  
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4. GRADEDNESS 
 
The previous sections have extended the insincerity conditions for lying to attitudes other 
than assertions. This is an important advance in the definition of lying, but it still overlooks 
one often-undervalued feature of insincerity: the fact that it comes in degrees. As Montaigne 
nicely stated, while truth is unique, “the opposite of truth has many shapes, and an indefinite 
field” (Montaigne E: 1.IX). There is a whole grey area of ‘half-sincere’ utterances that are 
difficult to classify and, quite importantly, it is in this grey zone that liars strive. 
To shed some light on this obscure area, this section will consider cases involving partial 
insincerity; for example, statements that are not fully believed to be false, but that are 
nevertheless not believed to be true. Are these statements lies? And how much confidence 
in their falsity is required for them to count as lies? We will discuss such questions, and 
explore the thin, elusive line that distinguishes a sincere assertion from an insincere one. 
This will be a hard challenge, and indeed for a theory of lying “the more difficult task [is] 
that of drawing lines” (Bok 1989:49). 
The standard, simplistic account of the insincerity condition for lying is that an utterance is 
a lie only if the speaker believes it to be false. However, the expression “believe to be false” 
is not really helpful to deal with intermediate cases, as it does not specify what degree of 
confidence in the falsity of p counts as believing it be false. In what follows, I will develop a 
version of the insincerity condition that be able to classify statements that are neither fully 
believed to be false, nor fully believed to be true. For most of my discussion, I will pretend 
to adopt the only belief view: this will allow me to provisionally set aside the intricacies that 
arise when we consider attitudes other than belief. In the last section, I will extend the 
analysis to other attitudes, to provide a final, complete account of the insincerity conditions 
for lying. 
 
4.1 The dichotomic view and the traditional insincerity condition 
 
Both deceptionist and non-deceptionist typically agree on the following formulation of the 
insincerity condition for lying (call it the ‘traditional insincerity condition’, or TIC): 
  
(TIC) S believes that p is false 
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Scholars endorsing this condition tend to take for granted that a statement is sincere when 
the speaker believes it to be true, and insincere when the speaker believes it to be false66, 
and that a more fine-grained analysis would be unnecessarily intricate (Saul 2012:5, fn10). 
From this perspective (call it the dichotomic view), the definition of lying correctly rules out 
only statements that are believed to be true.  
 
THE DICHOTOMIC VIEW 
A statement is sincere when the speaker believes it to be true, and 
insincere when the speaker believes it to be false, tertium non datur 
 
It is not obvious, however, that the dichotomic view is correct, nor that TIC offers a 
satisfying characterisation of the insincerity condition for lying (Mahon 2015:1.5). There is 
good ground to suspect that the dichotomic view is not an adequate assumption defining 
lying, because a number of intermediate credal states67 exist between believing p to be true 
and believing p to be false. 
First, it is possible for a speaker to believe that a statement is only partly false (rather than 
utterly false): in this case, the speaker believes that p has a ‘graded truth value’. Second, it 
is possible for a speaker not to be certain; in other words, to have a graded degree of 
confidence (rather than a flat-out belief) in the falsity of a statement: intermediate beliefs of 
this kind are called ‘graded beliefs’. The difference between these two layers of gradedness 
can be difficult to grasp: in section 4.2 and 4.3 I will explain in detail this subtle distinction. 
In what follows, I introduce two counterexamples to the dichotomic view: namely, lies that 
involve beliefs about graded truth values (4.2) and lies that involve graded beliefs (4.3). I 
develop a non-dichotomic alternative to the TIC that counts this kind of statement as lies 
and allows for various degrees of insincerity in lying, according to which the speaker must 
believe his statement to be more likely to be false than true (4.4). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 A third option sometimes considered is that the speaker has no opinion about p (he lacks a credal 
state about p); I will come back on this in section 4.3. 
67 In epistemology, “credal state” indicates a specific kind of mental state: i.e. the mental state of 
having a belief. Similarly, “credence” denotes a belief, in particular a graded belief (cf. section 4.3). 
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4.2 Graded Truth Values 
 
Every species is vague, every term goes cloudy at its edges, 
and so in my way of thinking, relentless logic is only another 
name for stupidity—for a sort of intellectual pigheadedness.  
 
H.G. Wells, First and Last Things (1908) 
 
 
A first motive to challenge the dichotomic view emerges if one considers the question of 
lying from outside the framework of bivalent (i.e. two-valued) logics. According to 
traditional, bivalent logics, the truth value of a proposition is either true or false, tertium 
non datur, so that there is no point in distinguishing between a statement that is false and a 
statement that is not true. By contrast, many-valued logics allow for a larger set of truth 
values. If ‘true’ and ‘false’ are not the only two possible truth-values that one can assign to 
propositions, the assumption that speakers can only have beliefs involving these two truth-
values strikes as spurious, or at least unwarranted. 
In the literature on lying, Chisholm & Feehan have offered a discussion of insincerity that 
can be read as a challenge to a bivalent account of insincerity68. According to their alternative 
insincerity condition, a speaker lies only if he states what he believes to be false or not true 
(I call this the fuzzy insincerity condition, FIC). 
 
Fuzzy Insincerity Condition 
FIC: S believes p to be false or not true 
 
This alternative formulation of the insincerity condition relies on the subtle difference 
between believing that p is false and believing that p is not true. Chisholm & Feehan (1977, 
152) note that “it is logically possible to believe one of these things [e.g. p is not true] and 
not the other [e.g. p is false]”. One way to interpret this claim is to consider the difference 
                                                 
68  Chisholm & Feehan do not discuss their alternative insincerity condition in detail, nor they 
mention explicitly that their aim is to challenge a bivalent account of beliefs: the “challenge” I 
mention here is thus quite indirect. My primary aim is not an exegesis of their article; I merely take 
a cue from their work to develop an alternative insincerity condition that allows for degrees of 
insincerity. 
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between false and not true within a specific many-valued logic theoretical framework, 
namely fuzzy logic69. 
Fuzzy logic is a many-valued logic conceived especially for predicates that are intrinsically 
vague (like being bald, or old, or happy) and that, being graded in nature, allow for a 
number of truth values. Fuzzy logic takes as truth values all real numbers between 0 and 1, 
where 0 is false and 1 is true. From this perspective, to say that the speaker believes that a 
proposition p is not true is to say that the speaker believes that the truth value of p is x, 
where x is 0≤x<1. By contrast, to say that the speaker believes that a proposition p is false 
is to say that the speaker believes that the truth value of p is 0. Against the dichotomic view, 
stating what is believed to be not true is thus not the same as stating what is believed to be 
false. Believed-false statements are a subset of insincere statements. 
Let us call lies that involve these intermediate beliefs (beliefs about graded truth values) 
fuzzy lies. Now, consider an example of fuzzy lie to grasp the difference from traditional 
lies. Suppose that Mickey utters (1) to persuade Daisy to date Donald: 
 
(1) Donald is not bald 
 
If Mickey thinks that Donald is almost definitely bald (e.g. he believes that (1) has a truth 
value of 0.2), he does not say something that he believes to be utterly false, and therefore 
the TIC does not count (1) as lying. However, intuitively Mickey is lying70. The fuzzy 
insincerity condition FIC accommodates our intuitions in counting (1) as a fuzzy lie, since 
(1) is believed to be not true (0.2 is less than 1 and more than 0). 
FIC is broader than TIC: it allows all statements whose truth value is believed to be less 
than 1 to count as lies. Moreover, it correctly rules out misleading statements (given that 
they are believed to be true), while ruling in all standard lies (given that they are believed to 
be false). Nevertheless, it seems patent that the FIC is too broad, for the set of statements 
                                                 
69 Other interpretations of the claim are possible, but they will not be discussed here, since the aim 
of this chapter is to outline the graded dimensions of lying. For a broader discussion of many-valued 
and fuzzy logics, see Hajek (1998) and Gottwald (2001, 423-492). 
70 Since I am focusing on the insincerity condition, I will always assume that in my examples the 
other conditions for lying obtain (i.e., that p is asserted with the intention to deceive). One might 
object that in this example (and in some of the following) condition (iii) does not obtain, because 
the speaker does not believe that his statement is utterly false, and thus does not believe that the 
statement is utterly deceiving. However, several philosophers (e.g. Chisholm & Feehan 1977, 145; 
Fallis 2011, 45; Staffel 2011, 301) argue that intending to alter someone’s degree of belief counts as 
intending to deceive them. Moreover, I have already provided strong reasons to doubt that the 
intention to deceive is a necessary condition for lying. 
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it allows to count as lies is too large. For instance, if Mickey believes (1) to have a truth-
value of 0.8, FIC would predict that Mickey is lying, but this is counterintuitive, as Mickey 
in this case believes that Donald is almost definitely not bald. To avoid this problem, one 
could narrow the FIC in order to require that the believed truth value of the statement be 
closer to falseness than truthfulness– make it x, where x is 0≤x≤0,5 (call this the revised 
fuzzy insincerity condition, henceforth FIC*). 
 
Fuzzy insincerity condition, revised 
FIC*: S believes that p has a truth value comprised between 0 and 0,5 
 
This solution is nevertheless problematic, since there seems not to be a clear theoretical 
basis to set the limit at a precise value. If one accepts that a speaker who believes that the 
truth value of his statement is 0.5 is lying, then it also seems reasonable to accept that a 
speaker who believes that the truth value of his statement is 0.51 is lying. But the same line 
of reasoning would work for the successive values (0.52; 0.53; [...]; 1), so that, in the end, 
all statements would count as lies. 
A further problem with this view concerns the very existence of such credal states: the 
proposed representation of the speaker’s beliefs is so fine-grained that it may appear to 
overrate reality. It seems quite clear that in real life we do not experience the threshold 
between believing a statement to have a truth value of 0.50 rather than 0.51. If such a 
threshold exists, it is not consciously perceived; and since lying is a conscious choice, no 
such threshold can be taken as a necessary condition for lying. 
Rather than positing a sharp ‘numerical’ threshold that separates insincerity from sincerity, 
one could limit the FIC to require that the believed truth value of the statement is 
perceivably closer to falseness than truthfulness.  
 
Fuzzy insincerity condition, revised again 
FIC’: S perceives p’s truth value to be closer to falseness than truthfulness 
 
The revised condition FIC’ may seem rough compared to its ‘numerical’ translation, but it 
acknowledges that our beliefs only roughly (and rarely) correspond to the subtle differences 
that fuzzy logic outlines. Whether or not one finds this revised definition convincing, 
eventually we will be forced to abandon it: as I will show in the next section, it incorrectly 
rules out lies that involve graded beliefs. 
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4.3 Graded beliefs 
 
The dichotomic view holds that we either believe something to be true, or we believe 
something to be false. This is certainly true if we restrict our analysis to cases of certainty. 
Here, by certainty I am referring to what philosophers call ‘psychological’ certainty71: the 
highest degree of confidence that a subject can have in the truth of a proposition. As long 
as this state of mind is concerned, it is certainly true that one can only be supremely 
confident that a proposition is true, or supremely confident that it is false. 
It does not seem, however, that we can only be supremely confident in the truth or falsity 
of a proposition. Quite the contrary: many of the beliefs we hold in our daily life involve a 
certain degree of uncertainty. This prompts the question of which kind of belief is involved 
in cases where certainty is not present. If certainty is the highest degree of confidence, there 
must be beliefs that involve a degree of confidence lower than certainty. These weaker 
beliefs, that do not fit within the framework of the dichotomic view, are known in the 
literature as ‘credences’, or ‘graded beliefs’.  
That ordinary beliefs can be graded is evident if one thinks about daily situations in which 
a subject lacks certainty in a proposition and nonetheless, to some extent, believes that 
proposition. Consider some further examples: suppose Groucho holds the following three 
beliefs: 
 
(1) I have a pair of moustaches 
(2) Bulgaria will beat Azerbaijan in their next football match 
(3) There is life on some other planet in the universe. 
 
At T1, Groucho regards (1) as certain, (2) as probable, (3) merely as more likely to be true 
than not.  Groucho neither fully believes nor fully disbelieves (2) or (3). His partial beliefs 
                                                 
71 Thus understood, certainty is always relative to someone’s standpoint: it does not matter if the 
subject has no ground (or bad grounds) for holding that belief, because certainty only requires that 
the subject be supremely convinced of its truth. Philosophers often distinguish psychological 
certainty from epistemic certainty (Klein 1998, Reid 2008, Stainley 2008). Epistemic certainty refers 
to the degree of epistemic warrant that a proposition has, independently of the speaker’s confidence 
in it (i.e. independently of psychological certainty). While psychological certainty is purely 
‘subjective’ (it only depends on the subject’s confidence), epistemic certainty is in a sense ‘objective’ 
(it depends on the actual solidity of the subject’s reasons to believe in that proposition). The 
literature on lying is concerned with psychological certainty, since the strength of the speaker’s 
grounds for disbelieving an assertion is irrelevant to assess whether he is insincere or not. 
Consequently, in this chapter, “certainty” (and “uncertainty”) will refer to psychological certainty 
(and uncertainty). 
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in (2) is (3) (believing to be probable, believing to be unlikely, etc.) are what philosophers 
call ‘graded beliefs’, because they can be ordered in a graded scale72: Groucho is more 
confident in the truth of (1) than he is in (2), and in (2) than he is in (3). Formal accounts 
of degrees of belief (namely Bayesian accounts) represent this scale with real numbers from 
0 to 1, where 0 indicates certainty in the falsity of p, 1 indicates certainty in the truth of p, 
and 0.5 indicates uncertainty – in other words, that the subject regards p just as likely to be 
true as false. On this view, uncertainty is the middle point (0.5) of a continuum of degrees 
of belief whose poles are certainty in the falsity (0) and in the truth (1) of the proposition 
(cf. Figure 1). To provide a formal account of the previous example, one could say that 
Groucho has a degree of belief of 1 in (2), of 0.75 in (3), of 0.55 in (4).  
 
 
Figure 1: A visual representation of the certainty-uncertainty continuum 
 
 
The fact that epistemic agents can hold a wide array of graded beliefs is at odds with the 
dichotomic view, that only allows for full belief in truth and full belief in falsity. Since graded 
beliefs and uncertainty are ordinary psychological states, it seems that a theory of lying 
should account for them (Meibauer 2014: 223, D’Agostini 2012:41). For instance, suppose 
that Groucho states (2) (that Bulgaria will beat Azerbaijan) while believing that it is probably 
false, or as likely to be false as true. Would his statement be sincere or insincere? More 
generally, how are we to draw the boundary between sincere and insincere utterances, and 
(consequently) between lies and not lies? 
 
4.4 A ‘graded’ definition of insincerity  
 
To see that the standard account of insincerity struggles to handle graded beliefs in a 
satisfactory way, let us consider a new example, inspired by recent historical events (cf. 
                                                 
72 For a discussion of the mutual relations between flat-out beliefs and graded beliefs, see Frankish 
(2009). 
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Carson 2010:212-21): George is a political leader, and tells (1) to a journalist. Propositions 
(a), (b), and (c) indicate George’s degree of confidence in his utterance, in four possible 
scenarios73. 
 
(1) Iraq has weapons of mass destruction 
(a) (1/¬p)         [Iraq has certainly no weapons of mass destruction] 
(b)  (0.75/p)     [Probably, Iraq has weapons of mass destruction] 
(c) (0.75/¬p)    [Probably, Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction] 
 
Scenario (1a) is a clear-cut case of lying, since George believes (1) to be certainly false: the 
traditional insincerity condition (TIC) correctly tracks the intuition that, since George 
believes (1) to be false, (1) is a lie. In (1b), by contrast, George believes the statement to be 
probably true: even if he is not completely confident that the statement is true, it seems that 
in this case he is not lying (but cf. Marušić 2012:8). The utterance is inaccurate, and perhaps 
misleading, because it misrepresents George’s degree of belief in (1). However, being 
inaccurate or misleading is clearly not the same as lying (Saul 2012, Stokke 2013b). Also in 
this case, TIC makes the right predictions. 
Problems arise for scenario (1c), where George believes (1) to be probably false. It seems 
that TIC does not count this case as a lie, because George does not utterly believe (1) to be 
false74. However, intuitively this is a case of lying, because George is saying something he 
believes to be very likely false. Since it excludes this sort of cases, TIC is too narrow, and 
needs some refinement. 
Cases like (1b,c) suggests that a more fine-grained account of lying is needed, one that 
appreciates how lying can involve graded beliefs. The fuzzy insincerity condition (FIC’) will 
be of little help here. Such condition accounts for lies that involve beliefs about graded truth 
values (fuzzy lies), but it does not account for lies that involve graded beliefs (graded-belief 
lies) about plain truth values. Such a subtle difference is worth an explanation. 
                                                 
73 Assigning a defined, numeric degree of belief to these linguistic expressions (e.g. “probably”, 
“perhaps”) merely aims to indicate how these expressions can be ordered on a scale that goes from 
certainty to doubt (Holmes 1982, Levinson 1983:134, Hoye 1997). Only their reciprocal relation 
in the scale matters to the present discussion – the accuracy of the numeric values is not important.  
74 To save TIC against this objection, a partisan of the standard view might suggest to interpret TIC 
in a non-literal sense, so that (2) counts as a case of believing p to be false, and hence as lying. 
However, this broad interpretation would open the problem of which intermediate credal states 
count as believing false and which do not. Since this is exactly the problem that the sincerity 
condition should solve, TIC would still be an unattractive option to settle the issue. 
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Let us represent the general structure of beliefs as “B(p)”, where the variable “B” takes 
beliefs as values, and the variable “p” takes the truth-value of the propositional content of 
beliefs as values. The dichotomic view assumes that both “p” and “B” can assume as values 
only 1 or 0: either a subject believes p, or he does not believe p, and either he believes p to 
be true, or he believes p to be false. 
Non-dichotomic accounts, by contrast, assume that “p” and/or “B” can take as values all 
the real numbers from 0 to 1. Fuzzy lies involve non-whole “p” values, while graded-belief 
lies involve non-whole “B” values. In 4.2 I provided an example of a fuzzy lie; let us contrast 
it with the graded-belief lie now: 
  
(1) Iraq has weapons of mass destruction 
(2) Donald is not bald 
  
If George is confident, but not sure that (1) is false (e.g., a degree of confidence of 0.2 in 
(1)), it seems clear that George is lying: his lie is a graded-belief lie. In this case, 0.2 expresses 
the value of “B”, so that 0.2 indicates George’s subjective degree of confidence in the 
probability of (1). This case is different from the fuzzy lie example discussed in 4.3: in that 
case, 0.2 indicated the truth value of (2). In the fuzzy lie example, Mickey had an outright 
belief (B=1) that Donald is almost definitely bald – i.e., that the truth value of (2) is 0.2.  
The FIC allows for fuzzy lies like (2) to count as lies, but do not count graded-belief lies 
like (1) as lies, and is therefore too narrow. An alternative insincerity condition that allows 
graded-belief lies can be found in Carson (2006: 298). His proposal comes in two varieties: 
he presents a strong and a weak version of his ‘insincerity condition’ for lying. The first, 
‘strong’ version requires that the speaker believe his assertion to be “false or probably false”. 
Let us call Carson’s first condition the ‘strong insincerity condition’ for lying (SIC): 
 
Strong insincerity condition 
(SIC)S believes p to be at least probably false75 
 
SIC correctly captures prototypical cases of lying like (1a) (repeated below). Unlike the 
traditional definition, it also includes lies that are not believed with certainty to be false, like 
(1c), that George believes to be probably false. This is an advantage of SIC over the 
                                                 
75 I rephrased Carson’s condition to avoid the counterintuitive consequence that degrees of belief 
included between “believing false” and “believing probably false” would not count as lies. 
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traditional condition TIC, since it seems intuitive that saying what you believe to be 
probably false counts as lying – even if it is arguably less insincere, and less deceptive, than 
a full-fledged lie. 
However, the limit set by the SIC strikes as arbitrary: it is not clear what justifies drawing 
the boundary between sincerity and insincerity exactly on the degree of confidence 
indicated by ‘probably’, and not someplace else. The term ‘probably’ indicates a degree of 
confidence in the proposition higher than uncertainty and lower than certainty: for the sake 
of the argument, let us assume it stands for a degree of belief of 0.75 or higher. If a degree 
of belief of 0.75 in the falsity of the proposition is enough for lying, there seems to be no 
reason to exclude lower graded beliefs like 0.7, or 0.6, that are perceivably higher than 
uncertainty (0.5). 
 
(1) Iraq has weapons of mass destruction 
(a) (1/¬p)         [Iraq has certainly no weapons of mass destruction] 
(c) (0.75/¬p)   [Probably, Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction] 
(d) (0.6/¬p)  [Presumably Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction] 
 
For instance, in (1d), George utters what he believes to be more likely to be false than true, 
so that it seems that he is lying. However, SIC does not capture (1d), because by hypothesis 
George’s degree of confidence is higher than uncertainty but falls short of believing (1) to 
be probably false. In failing to account for the intuition that also (1d) is a lie (even if arguably 
less insincere than (1c)), SIC is too restrictive. Furthermore, it is not clear that Carson’s SIC 
is able to capture fuzzy lies: only outright falsity is mentioned in the formulation, leaving it 
unspecified whether believing a proposition to have a truth value of more than 0 would 
qualify to satisfy SIC. 
Carson’s second, ‘weak’ proposal avoids both problems. The ‘weak insincerity condition’ 
(WIC) posits that lying requires that the speaker “does not believe [the asserted 
proposition] to be true” (Carson 2006, cf. also Davidson 1985:88, Sorensen 2007:256, 
2011:407, Fallis 2013:346). 
 
Weak insincerity condition 
(WIC) S does not believe p to be true 
 
Since it acknowledges that utterances like (1d) are lies, WIC is preferable to SIC. 
Furthermore, WIC seems compatible with fuzzy lies. Arguably, if S believes p to have a 
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truth-value inferior to 0.5 (or perceives that value to be closer to falseness than truthfulness), 
S does not believe that p. If we accept this principle, WIC is broadly equivalent to FIC’. 
However, the WIC is too broad: it incorrectly captures cases in which the speaker has no 
idea whether what he says is true or false, but goes on saying it for some independent 
reasons. These cases are classified in the literature as bullshit (Frankfurt 1986). The typical 
example of bullshitter is the politician who “never yet considered whether any proposition 
were true or false, but whether it were convenient for the present minute or company to 
affirm or deny it” (Swift 1710). For instance, consider the following example of deceptive 
bullshitting. Nick is a politician who does not know what the acronym LGBT refers to. 
When asked by a journalist about his opinion on LGBT rights, Nick answers:  
 
(2) LGBT rights are of central importance for our party 
 
In uttering (3), Nick does not have the slightest idea whether what he said is true or false. 
His only concern is to trick the journalist into thinking that he knows what he is talking 
about. It seems that he is not lying, but the WIC counts incorrectly his statement as a lie, 
since Nick does not believe that his statement is true. As a matter of fact, philosophers seem 
to agree that, as long as the speaker has no opinion about the veracity of what he is saying, 
his utterance is better classified as a misleading utterance than as a lie (Saul 2012:20, 
Meibauer 2014: 103, but cf. Falkenberg 1988:93, Carson 2010:61-2); if one wants to 
account for this intuition, the WIC is too broad. 
Since the SIC is too narrow and the WIC is too broad, an ideal condition has to lie 
somewhere in the middle. To find a middle ground between these two proposals, we can 
require that the speaker believe p more likely to be false than true. Call this the comparative 
insincerity condition: 
 
Comparative insincerity condition 
CIC: S believes p more likely to be false than true 
 
Unlike WIC, CIC correctly rules out bullshit and statements uttered in cases of uncertainty. 
Unlike TIC, it counts graded-belief lies as lies. And unlike SIC, it rules in the other cases 
in which the speaker does not believe the statement to be true – like (1c) and (1d).  
A first worry about the CIC is that it implicitly accepts the view that every belief can be 
represented as an assessment of probability. In case one finds this hypothesis disputable, 
one might prefer a phrasing that avoids a terminology that is committed to this view. 
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Furthermore, it might be argued that it is not clear that CIC rules in fuzzy lies. We might 
stipulate, in a similar spirit of what we did for WIC, that if S believes p to have a truth-value 
inferior to 0.5 (or perceives that value to be closer to falseness than truthfulness), S thereby 
believes p more likely to be false than true. But an even better solution might be to 
introduce a phrasing that avoids both these worries: 
 
Comparative insincerity condition, revised 
CIC*: S is more confident in ¬p than he is confident in p 
 
CIC* has the same strength points of CIC, but on top of that it clearly rules in fuzzy lies, 
and is not committed to understanding graded beliefs in terms of assessment of 
probabilities. A last worry might survive about the very assumption that there is a clear-cut 
boundary between insincerity and sincerity. Perhaps there are indeterminate cases that 
amount to neither lying nor not lying, and we should treat insincerity and lying are vague 
predicates – a similar problem, after all, seemed to apply to FIC. But this intuition can be 
accommodated without altogether rejecting CIC: unlike other insincerity conditions, this is 
the only one that allows for a progressive transition from sincerity to insincerity. On the 
other hand, if lying and insincerity are not vague predicates and a neat point of transition is 
to be individuated, the CIC is fine-grained enough to identify the boundary that gets closer 
to our intuitions, avoiding the counterexamples to which the alternative accounts fall victim 
(and if one has worries similar to those that applied to FIC, CIC* can be qualified by 
requiring that the speaker is perceivably more confident in ¬p than he is confident in p). 
 
4.5 Expressing graded beliefs and graded truth values 
 
We have seen that an assertion is insincere if there is a certain discrepancy (defined by 
CIC*) between the speaker’s belief (henceforth BΨ) and the belief expressed by the 
sentence (henceforth BΛ). This discrepancy can come in degrees, because of the graded 
nature of beliefs and of the content of beliefs – i.e. the graded nature of BΨ discussed so 
far. For a complete picture, we need to look at the other side of the coin: how insincerity is 
affected by the different degrees of belief that an assertion can express – the graded nature 
of BΛ. 
Speakers employ several linguistic devices to express graded beliefs, or belief about graded 
truth values. We know from our experience as ordinary language speakers that it is possible 
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to modulate the intensity of a statement, either mitigating or reinforcing it, thereby altering 
the strength of the belief expressed in BΛ. For instance, instead of simply uttering (1), a 
speaker can alternatively downgrade his assertion by uttering (1*) or emphasise it by uttering 
(1**): 
 
(1) Giusi is pretty  
(1*) Giusi is kind of pretty somehow 
(1**) Believe me, Giusi is absolutely pretty 
 
Now, the previous section has considered graded-belief lies, in which BΨ is graded. Graded 
assertions like (1*) and (1**), by contrast, are cases in which BΛ is graded: the former is 
intuitively a weaker assertion, whereas the latter is intuitively a stronger one. In pragmatics, 
the two opposite phenomena of mitigation (1*) and reinforcement (1**) have often been 
studied separately, and labelled with different names: for the former, “attenuation”, 
“weakening” and “downgrading”; for the latter, “strengthening” and “emphasising” (see 
Fraser 1980, Coates 1987, Bazzanella et al. 1991, Caffi 2007, Egan & Weatherson 2011). 
The label of intensity (Holmes 1984, Labov 1984) unifies these two opposite directions of 
modulation. 
The intensity of an utterance can be modified along different dimensions. In what follows, 
I discuss how intensity markers can modify the propositional content of an assertion to 
express different graded truth-values (4.5.1); and modify the illocutionary force of an 
assertion, to express different graded beliefs (4.5.2-3). 
 
4.5.1 Intensity and propositional content 
 
The propositional content of a statement can be modulated both on the axis of quality 
(precision) and of quantity (augmentation or diminution). Expressions like “a little”, “very”, 
“much”, or “quite” are used to modify intensity on the axis of quantity. These linguistic 
devices allow the speaker to slightly alter the truth conditions of his statements (Lakoff 1973, 
478-488). For instance, if Bruce utters (2*) rather than (2), he quantifies Robin’s gladness 
to a lower degree, thus altering the truth-conditions of his statement: 
 
(2) Robin is glad 
(2*) Robin is pretty glad 
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In section 4.2, I considered fuzzy lies, i.e. lies that involve beliefs about graded truth values. 
Utterances like (2*), similarly, are insincere statements that express beliefs about graded 
truth values. This analogy suggests that, with respect to fuzzy lies, we have to consider two 
graded layers of insincerity: the layer of the speaker’s beliefs and the layer of the beliefs 
expressed by his statements. For instance, Bruce can tell a fuzzy lie either by ‘plainly’ stating 
(2) while believing that (2) is partly false (e.g. 0.3-true) or by stating (2*) while believing that 
(2) is utterly false (that is, believing that (2*) is partly false). 
 
4.5.2. Two directions of belief misrepresentation 
 
A similar, but more complex discourse applies to the degrees of belief expressed by 
assertions. Assertions that express graded beliefs are generally overlooked in the literature 
on lying. This is because, in standard cases, statements express a flat-out belief in the truth 
of the proposition, rather than a graded belief. For instance, (3) expresses a flat-out belief 
in the asserted proposition: 
 
(3) Iraq has weapons of mass destruction 
 
Not all statements, however, are as simple as (3), for some express graded beliefs. For 
instance, (3a) indicates that the speaker believes that (3) is probably true, and (3b) expresses 
uncertainty in the truth of the proposition: 
 
(3a) (0.75/p) Probably Iraq has weapons of mass destruction 
(3b) (0.5/p) Maybe Iraq has weapons of mass destruction 
 
Few authors have raised the question of how assertions that express graded beliefs are to 
be analysed within a theory of lying. Meibauer (2014: 225) suggests that there are three 
kinds of graded insincere assertions that may qualify as lies: those “(i) expressing certainty 
when [you] are uncertain, those (ii) expressing uncertainty when [you] are certain, and those 
(iii) expressing certainty or uncertainty to a higher degree than being adequate with respect 
with [your] knowledge base”. Since the third case seems to include the previous two, to 
simplify this taxonomy I will simply distinguish between two ‘directions’ in misrepresenting 
your degree of belief: namely, pretending to have a higher degree of belief or a lower degree 
of belief than the one you have (cf. Falkenberg 1988:93). 
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A first, tempting idea is to assume that these two directions are equivalent. This would mean 
that, from the point of view of the analysis of lying, “pretending to be more certain than you 
are” is as insincere as “pretending to be less certain than you are”. A reason to make this 
assumption is that the ‘discrepancy’ between your state of mind and the state of mind 
expressed by the statement is the same in both cases. However, at a closer look this 
assumption reveals it to be naïve, as the first case (overstating) is often perceived as being 
more insincere, or more misleading, than the second (understating). To see this, consider 
the two utterances: 
 
(3c) (1/p) Certainly Iraq has weapons of mass destruction 
(3d) (0.5/p) Perhaps Iraq has weapons of mass destruction 
  
Imagine that in both cases George’s mental state is in between certainty and uncertainty, so 
that he believes:  
 
(0.75/p) [Probably Iraq has weapon of mass destruction] 
 
According to the ‘naïve’ view, (3c) and (3d) are equivalent scenarios, because the 
discrepancy between BΨ and BΛ is the same (0.25). These scenarios differ only in the 
direction of misrepresentation: (3c) represents the speaker as having a higher degree of 
belief than he has, while (3d) as having a lower degree of belief. Interestingly, however, it is 
natural to assess (3c) as more insincere than (3d). The reason is that we tend to judge (3d) 
as a prudent statement, that cooperatively avoids saying more than the speaker knows, while 
(3c) is perceived a misleading overstatement, that the speaker has not sufficient knowledge 
to assert. In other words, ceteris paribus, understating your degree of belief is generally seen 
as a cooperative linguistic practice, while overstating it is generally regarded as 
uncooperative. 
In line with this intuition, Falkenberg (1988: 94, 1990) proposes to distinguish between 
‘hard lies’ (overstatements, like (3c)) and ‘soft lies’ (understatements, like (3d)). However, 
this taxonomy is misleading in two respects. First, not all overstatements and 
understatements are lies: if the CIC is a condition for lying, only statements displaying a 
certain level of discrepancy between BΨ and BΛ can be lies. Second, it is not clear whether 
an overstatement (hard lie) is necessarily more of a lie than an understatement (soft lie): the 
next section will show that the direction of misrepresentation is just one of the parameters 
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of intensity that must be considered, another one being the magnitude of the discrepancy 
between BΨ and BΛ.  
 
4.5.3. Epistemic modals and degrees of commitment 
 
The most prominent linguistic devices used to mitigate or reinforce the degree of belief 
expressed by an assertion (expression like ‘certainly’, ‘probably’, ‘perhaps’) are called 
epistemic modals. This section will analyse how they alter the degree of belief expressed by 
the assertion, and clarify why we generally assess understatements as more sincere (or more 
honest) than overstatements. 
On a pragmatic level, epistemic modals both “indicate the speaker’s confidence or lack of 
confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed” and “qualify [his] commitment to the 
truth of the proposition expressed in [his] utterance” (Coates 1987:112, italic is mine). In 
other words, they act on two components of the assertion, altering both (1) the psychological 
state expressed by the speaker (the degree of belief), and (2) his degree of commitment to 
the truth of the proposition (the illocutionary strength76) (cf. Sbisà & Labinaz 2014:52, Lyons 
1977: 793-809; Holmes 1984: 349). 
These two functions are distinct in nature, but entangled: if a speaker S mitigates (or 
reinforces) the degree of belief conveyed by his assertion, then S automatically mitigates (or 
reinforces) the illocutionary force of his assertion (that is, his degree of commitment to the 
truth of the proposition). For instance, if you state (4b) instead of plainly stating (4), you 
both mitigate the degree of belief expressed ((4b) expresses uncertainty in (4)) and lower 
the degree of your commitment to the truth of the asserted proposition (you are committed 
to the truth of (4) to a much lower degree if you utter (4b))77. 
                                                 
76  The illocutionary force of an assertion can be reinforced or mitigated (Bazzanella, Caffi & Sbisà 
1991; Sbisà 2000; Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 99), thus altering the speaker’s degree of 
commitment to the truth of the proposition. More generally, “along the same dimension of 
illocutionary point there may be varying degrees of strength or commitment” (Searle 1976:5). 
Epistemic modals and other intensity markers can modify these degrees of strength (Holmes 1984; 
Bazzanella, Caffi & Sbisà 1991; Sbisà 2000; Searle & Vanderveken 1985:99). For a discussion on 
the distinction between illocutionary and propositional mitigation, see Caffi (1999, 2007) and Fraser 
(2010:16-17). 
77 On this ‘expressivist’ interpretation, epistemic modals are not part of the proposition asserted (at 
least not of the proposition against which speaker sincerity and commitment is assessed). A 
‘descriptivist’ might object that we should instead take them to be part of the content of the assertion 
(and hence of the proposition against which sincerity is measured). However, this would often yield 
counterintuitive predictions for the sincerity conditions of assertions. For instance, on a descriptive 
interpretation of “certainly p” as true iff (q): “the speaker is certain that p”, a speaker that believes 
that there are 9/10 chances that p is true would counterintuitively be counted as insincere (as S 
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(4) Plato will quit smoking tomorrow 
(4b) Perhaps Plato will quit smoking tomorrow 
 
The role that epistemic modals play in reinforcing/weakening the illocutionary force of 
assertions explains why understatements are perceived as more honest than overstatements. 
Ceteris paribus (given the same degree of insincerity, like in (3c)-(3d)) a reinforced assertion 
has a stronger illocutionary force than a mitigated assertion, so that the speaker has a 
stronger commitment to its truth. And if the commitment to sincerity is stronger in 
reinforced statements, then violating that commitment is more serious in those statements 
than in mitigated ones. 
Variations in illocutionary force induced by epistemic modals can affect whether the 
speaker is asserting the proposition or not – and hence whether he is lying, because lying 
requires asserting. This is because epistemic modals can downgrade the degree of 
illocutionary force of a declarative sentence to such an extent that it longer counts as an 
assertion, but rather as a supposition or a hypothesis (Sbisà & Labinaz 2014:52-3). For 
instance, (4b) is a supposition rather than an assertion: its insincere utterance does not 
amount to lying, while insincerely uttering its unmitigated version (4) does. Carson (2010: 
33,38) shares this intuition: “there are weaker and stronger ways of warranting the truth of 
a statement. To count as a lie, a statement must be warranted to a certain minimum degree”. 
This is even more evident in other speech acts. For instance, if Matteo utters (5b) instead 
of (5), it is clear that he has not promised that he will buy you an elephant (he is merely 
suggesting it), while he would be promising it if he uttered (5). It seems that an insincere 
utterance of the first amounts to lying, while this is not true for the second78.  
                                                 
would be certain that q is false). It should be noted that even if this section provides sincerity 
conditions for marked assertions interpreted in an expressivist fashion, it is not committed to 
expressivism: a descriptivist can still adopt the model proposed in section 1 (CIC). I follow Coates’ 
(1987:130) view that epistemic modals can be appropriately used and interpreted in both ways. 
When they are used ‘literally’ to assert the epistemic or psychological (un)certainty of a proposition 
(rather than express that the proposition asserted is (un)certain, the simple sincerity conditions 
provided by CIC will apply; in the other cases (that I take to be the prevalent uses), the expressivist 
explanation outlined in this section will apply instead.  On the debate over the semantics of 
epistemic modals, cf. Kratzer (1981), DeRose (1991), Egan, Hawtorne & Weatherson (2005), 
Papafragou (2006), Fintel & Gillies (2008), Yalcin (2007, 2011), Swanson (2011). 
78 One might wonder whether uttering (4b) or (3b) while being certain that the mitigated proposition 
is false would count as lying – i.e. if a high degree of insincerity can compensate for a low degree of 
commitment. Marsili (2014: 166-8) argues against this view, claiming that these utterances are to be 
classified as misleading statements rather than lies.  
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(5) Tomorrow I will buy you an elephant 
(5b) Perhaps tomorrow I will buy you an elephant 
 
This theoretical framework allows us to correctly analyse lying involving assertion that 
express graded beliefs (BΛ-graded lies, and complex cases where both BΛ and BΨ are 
graded). The problem with these assertions is that they cannot be dealt with simply by 
appealing to condition CIC. Without an account of how epistemic modals modify 
illocutionary force, CIC alone cannot account for the differences determined by the 
direction of misrepresentation (overstatements vs understatements). This difficulty 
dissipates once it is understood that epistemic modals influence not only whether the 
sincerity condition is satisfied (by altering the degree of belief expressed), but also whether 
the assertion condition is satisfied (by altering the speaker’s degree of commitment).  
To sum up, there are three entwined scalar parameters that we have to consider when we 
analyse the graded components of the belief expressed by an utterance: the graded truth 
value expressed by the utterance, the graded belief it communicates (these two parameters 
determine the degree of insincerity), and the degree of assertoric force of the utterance, or 
degree of commitment (this parameter determine if the speaker is asserting, and how 
strongly) that the speaker undertakes. For an utterance to count as a lie, both a certain 
degree of insincerity and a certain degree of commitment must obtain. 
 
4.6 Further graded components 
 
So far, I have considered aspects of intensity that are properly linguistic. Several 
paralinguistic devices can intervene to modulate the illocutionary force of an assertion. A 
significant factor is prosody, and specifically intonation: Gussenhoven (2002) remarks that 
variations in volume and tonal height are a powerful device to communicate the speakers’ 
confidence in the truth of his assertion. Among other influential factors that can be used to 
influence the strength of an utterance are pauses, rhythm of speech, repetitions and 
proxemic signals.  
Context is also an important factor to be considered. Bazzanella (2009, 78) points out that, 
among the parameters affecting the degree of insincerity of a lie, also “aspects of the global 
context [...], of the cotext [...] and of the local context” are of central importance. For 
instance, an utterance like (1) can express a different degree of certainty whether (1) is 
uttered in (context A) a restaurant, where a person addresses it to a dining companion that 
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is known not to like cheese, or (context B) in a hospital, where a doctor addresses it to a 
person that he knows to have a deadly allergy to cheese. In both cases, given that (1) is 
insincere, (1) is a lie, but it is more intense in the second case, since the commitment to the 
truth of the assertion is stronger in context A than in context B. 
 
(1) This meal contains no cheese 
 
       The very mitigating and reinforcing devices considered so far are influenced by 
contexts – in most cases, their very meaning is determined by contextual factors (Kratzer 
1981). For instance, the epistemic modal ‘definitely’ in (2) expresses a different degree of 
certainty and commitment depending on whether (2) is uttered in context A or in context 
B. 
 
(2) Definitely, this meal contains no cheese   
 
       Linguistic, paralinguistic and contextual elements determine a complex interplay of 
factors that influences the degree of illocutionary force of an assertion, and thus the degree 
of intensity of a lie. However, it seems to me that only linguistic devices (like epistemic 
modals) are strong enough to affect the status of an utterance as an assertion (and therefore 
as a lie). Paralinguistic and contextual elements can reinforce or mitigate an assertion, but 
they alone cannot determine if an utterance counts as an assertion or not. 
       In table 1, I summarise my taxonomy of the layers of gradedness involved in lying. 
This taxonomy is not meant to be exhaustive, but it succeeds in underlining a fact that has 
been ignored by the philosophical literature on lying for a long time: the multi-layered 
gradedness of lying. 
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Graded of beliefs Beliefs about graded truth values 
Graded beliefs about truth values 
Gradedness of statements Stating “beliefs about graded truth values” 
Stating “graded beliefs about truth values” 
Modifying illocutionary strength 
Gradedness of paralinguistic 
components 
Modifying illocutionary strength 
Gradedness of contexts Modifying illocutionary strength 
 
Table 1: A taxonomy of the dimensions of gradedness involved in lying. 
 
 
In conclusion, the gradedness of lying results from the interaction several parameters: on 
the side of beliefs (BΨ), graded beliefs and beliefs about graded truth values; on the side of 
statements expressing such beliefs (BΛ), the numerous ways to convey information about 
them in statements. In the literature on lying, scholars tend to completely ignore these 
graded features when they assume the dichotomic view as a starting point – a view that I 
proved to be inconsistent with our intuitions. 
I have provided several reasons to believe that the traditional insincerity condition is wrong, 
because it rules out fuzzy lies and graded-belief lies. Moreover, I have shown that the 
traditional insincerity condition yields a wrong description of lying, as it blinds us to its 
graded nature. My proposed definition corrects this picture and allows for fuzzy lies and 
graded-belief lies to be counted as genuine lies, and acknowledges the existence of many 
degrees of insincerity in lying. I have also shown that the very modifiers that affect the degree 
of belief expressed by an assertion modify its illocutionary force, affecting whether a given 
utterance counts as an assertion.  
My main aim in this section has been to show how the insincerity condition for lying need 
to be modified in order to correctly deal with cases involving graded insincerity. It should 
be kept in mind, however, that also other components of lying have graded features. The 
picture is complex: as Bazzanella (2009, 78) points out, “the different degrees of intensity 
in lying result from the complex interplay of various layers and parameters”. For instance, 
some authors (Chisholm & Feehan 1977; Fallis 2011; Staffel 2011; Marsili 2017) contend 
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that the intention to deceive, as well as the effects of deception, can be graded. Several 
pragmatic parameters determinant for lying are also graded, such as relevance (Sperber & 
Wilson 2002; Van der Henst et al. 2002), felicity, and the relations between the interactants 
(like social relations, and respective trust) (Bazzanella 2009).  
Finally, moral evaluations of lying can be graded – interestingly, in a way that can parallel 
the graded components of lying just identified. Intuitively, some lies are worse than others: 
lying to save a life is better than lying to get away with murder. Many factors will intervene 
in determining the reprehensibility of a lie: two obvious candidates will be the effects of the 
lie and the intentions of liar (quite obviously, good effects and intentions are preferable to 
bad ones). But especially from a deontologist perspective (Augustine DM, Aquinas ST, 
Kant GMM, SRTL, Newman 1880, Geach 1977, Pruss 1999, Tollefsen 2014, cf. also 
Isenberg 1964), a great deal of what is wrong with lying is that lying violates a moral norm 
of sincerity. In pointing out that such norm can be violated to a greater or lower extent, and 
in developing a formal model for measuring and describing the extent of such violations, 
my proposed account represents also a valuable tool for assessing the (im)morality of lying. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS – A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF INSINCERITY 
 
So far, in my discussion of the graded nature of insincerity I have ignored attitudes other 
than beliefs. In this final section, I will show how my discussion generalises to these other 
attitudes. As a starting point, let us reconsider the general speech-act theoretic account of 
insincerity presented in 2.2:  
 
INS:  The performance of an illocutionary act F(p) that expresses the psychological 
state Ψ(p) is insincere IFF in uttering F(p), S is not in Ψ(p) 
 
Applied to beliefs, INS gives us the following belief insincerity condition (BIC): 
 
BIC: S asserts that p insincerely only if S does not believe that p 
 
I have already discussed condition BIC (presented as Carson’s weak insincerity condition, 
or WIC) in detail, showing that BIC is able to deal with cases of graded insincerity, like 
fuzzy lies and graded lies. However, I rejected BIC as a necessary condition for lying, on 
the ground that it incorrectly counts bullshitting (saying something you neither believe to be 
true nor false) as lying. Since INS implies that the insincerity condition for assertion is BIC, 
INS is not well suited as a general account for the insincerity conditions for lying.  
On the other hand, in the IV.1 I mentioned that I am concerned with two related notions 
of insincerity: an account of the insincerity condition in the definition of lying, and an 
analysis of insincerity simpliciter. We have already seen that these two notions can come 
apart: for instance, speech acts that do not entail assertions (e.g. requests, orders) can be 
insincere but cannot be lies. INS is not viable as an account of the insincerity conditions for 
lying, but it seems an appropriate analysis of insincerity simpliciter. This is because 
bullshitting falls short of lying, but is arguably a form of insincere speech. If one shares this 
intuition, then bullshit is not a counterexample to BIC or INS understood as characterising 
insincerity simpliciter, rather than as a necessary condition for lying. If one, by contrast, 
intuits that bullshitting amounts to neither lying nor insincerely speaking, the general 
account of the insincerity condition for lying that I am about to delineate will coincide with 
their desired account of insincerity simpliciter, as both exclude bullshitting from the 
definition. 
149 
 
How can we narrow INS so that it excludes bullshitting but still generalises to speech acts 
other than assertion? In the previous section I have argued that the comparative insincerity 
condition CIC is preferable to BIC as a necessary condition for lying: 
 
CIC*: S is more confident in ¬p than he is confident in p 
 
The desired refinement of INS must entail CIC* rather than BIC, and generalise to speech 
acts that express attitudes other than beliefs. To be sure, at least when it comes to insincerity 
conditions for lying, we do not need to show that INS generalises to every possible attitude. 
In chapter III, I have shown that only commissive and assertive illocutionary acts can entail 
an assertion and thus count as lies (III.4). Since these families of speech acts only express 
either beliefs or intentions (Searle 1976), a general account of the insincerity conditions for 
lying only needs to generalise to intentions and beliefs. In other words, our minimal 
desideratum is an extension of the graded insincerity conditions for beliefs (CIC*) to 
intentions. 
It seems that we can reformulate the intention insincerity condition (IIC) in a way that 
parallels CIC*, namely in a way that involves a comparison between a psychological state 
and its opposite: 
 
IIC: S does not intend to p 
IIC*: S intends to not-p more than S intends to p 
 
Admittedly, the IIC* is a bit odd-sounding. One reason is that intentions do not seem to 
come in degrees in the same way belief do (but cf. Holton 2008). Intuitively, intending is 
an ‘on/off predicate’: either one intends to eat an apple, or one does not intend to eat an 
apple – it is just not clear which intermediate mental state could exist between the two. If 
this is right, it is not clear how allowing for intermediate cases between an intention and its 
opposite can introduce a meaningful refinement of IIC.  
Perhaps IIC* can be interpreted as involving a comparison between graded truth-values, 
rather than graded intentions. In other words, the point of IIC* would be to capture 
promises that express insincere intentions akin to fuzzy lies, rather than graded-belief lies. 
Suppose for instance that I promise to my girlfriend: 
 
(1) I promise (1*) [that I will get fit] 
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In promising (1), I express an intention with content (1*), namely an intention to get fit. It 
seems that this intention can be insincere to different extents: I can intend to definitely get 
fit (in which case (1*) has value of 1), intend to definitely not get fit (in which case (1*) has 
a value of 0), and I can have a number of intermediate intentions, depending on the graded 
truth-value assigned to (1*) – for instance, intending to get somewhat fit (in which case (1*) 
would have a value of, say, 0.3), get quite fit, etc. Unlike IIC, IIC* allows for these 
intermediate states. On top of this, it individuates a plausible boundary between these 
intermediate states, for the same reason that CIC* individuates the right boundary for 
beliefs – namely, it seems that the limit between insincerity and sincerity does not lie at any 
arbitrary point close to the extremes, but rather in between them. 
This is good news, as it shows that the CIC* can be neatly extended to attitudes other than 
beliefs. We can thus derive the following general insincerity condition for lying, from which 
both IIC* and CIC* can be derived: 
 
Graded insincerity condition for illocutionary acts 
INS-L:  The performance of an illocutionary act F(p) is insincere IFF in uttering F(p), 
S is in Ψ(¬p) more than S is in Ψ(p) 
 
INS-L is designed to deal with cases involving intentions or beliefs, but it also generalises to 
other attitudes, such as desires. If one has the intuition that bullshitting is not a form of 
insincerity, INS-L will also offer a plausible characterisation of insincerity simpliciter. More 
importantly, INS-L offers the general background that is needed to offer a general 
definition of lying that applies to speech acts other than assertions and attitudes other than 
beliefs. Such a definition, derived by integrating INS-2 into the definition of lying developed 
in chapter III, reads as follows: 
 
Speech act theoretic definition of lying 
In successfully uttering an illocutionary act with content p that expresses an attitude 
Ψ(p) and entails an assertion with content p, S lies to A about p iff:  
1.   S thereby asserts that p (i.e. conditions (a), (b), and (c) from III.3.1 obtain) 
2.   Either S is more confident in p than S is confident in ¬p, or S is in Ψ(¬p) more 
than S is in Ψ(p), or both  
 
In the case in which the speaker is asserting directly, this definition will reduce to the 
following: 
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Definition of lying by asserting 
In successfully uttering an illocutionary act with content p, S lies to A about p iff:  
1. S thereby asserts that p (i.e. (a), (b), and (c) obtain) 
2. S is more confident in ¬p than S is confident in p 
 
This completes this dissertation’s reflection on the definition of lying. My proposed 
definition is perhaps complex and thus less elegant than competing ones, but it gives better 
predictions than the alternative accounts, and finds independent theoretical support from 
a general theory of illocutionary acts. Unlike deceptionist accounts, it is not subject to 
counterexamples to the intention to deceive condition. Unlike assertion-based accounts, it 
deals correctly with lies involving explicit performatives. And unlike any other account, it is 
able to capture to speech acts other than assertions and attitudes other than beliefs, and to 
include both graded-belief lies and fuzzy lies.  
Thus far, I have provided a characterisation of what it means to lie and to be insincere. 
Avoiding lying and insincerity, however, is not all that we require from our interlocutors. In 
the next chapters, I will deal with another expectation that is fundamental for our 
communicative interactions, namely expectations about the epistemic standpoint of our 
interlocutors. When someone asserts something, we generally expect such claim to be 
backed up by some reasons, rather than mere belief – in other words, all things the same, 
a ‘gut feeling’ that a proposition is true is not enough for it to be assertable. However, it is 
not clear exactly which kind of epistemic standpoint is required for an assertion to be 
permissible qua assertion. The next chapter will deal the ‘epistemic norm of assertion’ 
hypothesis, namely the idea that assertions are subject to a norm of the form: “assert that p 
only if p has C”, where C indicates the unique epistemic property that a proposition must 
have for it to be assertable. 
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Part B - The norms of 
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B. The norms of assertion 
 
 
Quisquis autem hoc enuntiat quod vel creditum animo, vel 
opinatum tenet, etiamsi falsum sit, non mentitur. Hoc enim 
debet enuntiationis suae fidei, ut illud per eam proferat, 
quod animo tenet, et sic habet ut profert. Nec ideo tamen 
sine vitio est, quamvis non mentiatur, si aut non credenda 
credit, aut quod ignorat nosse se putat, etiamsi verum sit: 
incognitum enim habet pro cognito. 
 
Now whoever utters that which he holds in his mind either 
as belief or as opinion, even though it be false, he lies not. 
For this he owes to the faith of his utterance, that he thereby 
produce that which he holds in his mind, and has in that 
way in which he produces it. Not that he is without fault, 
although he lie not, if either he believes what he ought not 
to believe, or thinks he knows what he knows not, even 
though it should be true: for he accounts an unknown thing 
for a known. 
 
Augustine, De Mendacio, III.3 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I have provided a detailed analysis of a common communicative 
vice: lying, understood in terms of asserting something that you believe to be false. In this 
chapter, I will discuss another kind of communicative vice: that of asserting something in 
absence of the appropriate warrant or epistemic support. 
Once again, Augustine’s De Mendacio offers an interesting starting point to introduce the 
debate: in the passage quoted above, we can find what is arguably the first philosophical 
discussion of assertions that are sincere, but nonetheless unwarranted. Here Augustine is 
discussing the distinction between inadvertently saying something false and lying. We have 
already seen that this distinction is intuitively correct: lying and being mistaken about what 
you say are two different concepts. Importantly, here Augustine finds it necessary to specify 
that while inadvertently saying something false falls short of lying, also this kind of assertion 
involves a vitium - a fault, violation or vice. 
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What kind of vitium or fault exactly? There are many faults that we might identify in such 
assertions: lack of epistemic support, or more simply lack of accuracy, or of 
correspondence with reality. To make the discussion more concrete, let us consider an 
example. Suppose that Claudia and Rachel are having a conversation about their common 
friend Jacques, and Rachel asks Claudia whether Jacques is a good cook. Claudia has never 
tasted Jacques’ cuisine, nor has she got any second-hand information about Jacques’ 
abilities in the kitchen. However, Claudia knows that Jacques is French, and she is under 
the impression that French people are generally good cooks. On this basis, she replies: 
 
(1) Sure, Jacques is a good cook 
 
Suppose that Jacques is not, as a matter of fact, a good cook: he is utterly terrible in the 
kitchen. In this case Claudia is not lying; nonetheless, her assertion is not “without fault”, 
as Augustine would say. But which kind of fault is exactly involved in Claudia’s assertion 
that (1)? 
A contemporary approach to explaining what is wrong with (1) is to point out that the 
speaker (in this case, Claudia) failed to meet some relevant conversational norm, and 
consequently some conversational expectation. Arguably, assertors should have some 
epistemic ground to support what they say: there seem to be an implicit norm that dictates 
that they should meet some minimum epistemic standard before they assert something. In 
our example, (1) is false, and Claudia is not justified to believe that (1) is true. One way to 
explain what is wrong with (1), then, is to say that in uttering it Claudia violates a putative 
conversational norm – for instance, a norm requiring that you only utter true (or known, or 
reasonably believed) propositions. But Claudia’s assertion could also violate some other 
conversational expectation. In asking whether Jacques is a good cook, Rachel is expecting 
Claudia to base her assertion on some appropriate grounds, not on a wild guess; she expects 
her to assert a true proposition, not a false one. At least on a first intuitive level, it seems a 
reasonable hypothesis that we perceive wild guesses like (1) to be faulty because they violate 
some relevant conversational norm, or at least the expectations that might be reasonably be 
held by the participants in the conversation. 
In the last twenty years, the hypothesis that the faultiness of assertions like (1) might be 
explained in terms of the violation of a putative ‘norm of assertion’ has gained centre stage 
in philosophy of language and epistemology, sparking a lively debate around the question 
of which norm regulate assertions. Timothy Williamson’s “Assertion” (1996, revised in 
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2000) is the perhaps the first paper to explicitly and systematically address this question, 
and definitely the one responsible for initiating the contemporary debate over this issue. 
Williamson opens his paper by putting forward a simple hypothesis (Williamson 
2000:241):  
 
WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS 
What are the rules of assertion? An attractively simple suggestion is this. There is just 
one [constitutive]79 rule. Where C is a property of propositions, the rule says: 
 (The C-rule) • One must: assert p only if p has C. 
 
According to this hypothesis, there is only one rule, the C-rule, to which all and only 
assertions are subject – a rule that tells you which propositions you can properly assert and 
which ones you cannot. This rule requires you to assert only propositions that have the 
unspecified property ‘C’.  
Williamson clarifies that the C-rule (1) is unique to assertion: only assertion is regulated 
only by this rule. Since only assertions are regulated only by this rule, the C-rule also (2) it 
individuates assertion, defining it as the only speech act that is only subject to the rule. 
Furthermore, the C-rule (3) is constitutive of assertion: were assertion regulated by a 
different rule, it would be a different speech act. Furthermore, and relatedly, the C-rule is 
(4) a norm to which assertors are subject qua assertors. There are many normative 
constrains that can contribute in making an assertion overall wrong: an assertion can 
inappropriate because it is impolite, immoral, rude or irrelevant. While these are all good 
reasons not to proffer an assertion, they are not infractions that of a norm to which only 
assertions are subjects: commands, questions (and perhaps even some non-communicative 
behaviours) can be impolite, immoral, rude or irrelevant too. The norm that Williamson 
is looking for, by contrast, is a norm to which only assertions are subject, and to which 
assertors are subject in virtue of their being asserting something. 
WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS is indeed “attractively simple”: if correct, we can both define 
what assertion is and specify under which condition its performance is appropriate, simply 
by identifying one property, C. This raises the question that animates the debate: what kind 
of property is C? Williamson’s answer is that C is the property of being known by the 
                                                 
79 I have incorporated the claim that the norm is constitutive into the quotation for simplicity: in this 
way, all of Williamson’s key assumptions are displayed in a single passage. 
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assertor. In other words, assertion is governed by the norm that one should not assert what 
one does not know to be true: 
 
WILLIAMSON’S ANSWER: THE KNOWLEDGE-RULE 
KR: “You must: assert that p only if you know that p”. 
 
A number of philosophers have found KR a convincing answer (e.g. DeRose 2002; 
Hawthorne 2004; Benton 2014). However, the debate is far from settled, and Williamson’s 
position has elicited a number of critical responses. One could roughly divide these critical 
reactions into two categories. 
The first category comprises those who reject or challenge WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS, 
either in part or as a whole. Some philosophers (Brown 2008, Carter 2014; 2017, Carter & 
Gordon 2011, Gerken 2014, McKenna 2015) reject the assumption that there is only one 
norm of assertion. Others deny that assertion is regulated by a norm (Sosa 2009, cf. also 
Rescorla 2007; 2009), or that it is constituted by it (Hindriks 2007, Maitra 2011, Pagin 2011, 
McCammon 2014:137-9). Finally, some have gone so far as to claim that there is no such 
thing as an ‘assertion-game’ to which the putative rule applies (Cappelen 2011, Johnson 
2017). 
In the next chapter, I address criticisms of this kind. More specifically, I object to the claim 
that the C-rule is ‘constitutive’ of assertion. After reviewing several difficulties for this 
hypothesis, I show that abandoning the idea that the norm of assertion is constitutive also 
puts strain on the assumption that the norm is unique to assertion, and consequently on 
the assumption that assertion can be defined as the only speech act subject to this rule. 
The second category of criticisms comprises those coming from scholars who accept 
WILLIAMSON’S HYPOTHESIS, but refuse WILLIAMSON’S ANSWER in favour of a different 
one, i.e. an alternative account of what property C is. For instance, some maintain that a 
warranted assertion requires instead the truth of the proposition (Weiner 2005, Whiting 
2012), or some relevant reason to believe it (Lackey 2007, Kvanvig 2009). 
In chapter VI, I consider criticisms of this kind. More specifically, I address the 
disagreement between factive and non-factive accounts, i.e. accounts that do (like 
Williamson’s knowledge-rule) or do not require that the proposition is true. After 
presenting some objections to factive accounts, I present my own non-factive proposal. On 
this view, false assertions are faulty because they fail to meet the success-condition for 
asserting something (the purported aim of assertion), rather than a permissibility condition 
(the norm regulating assertion). 
159 
 
  
160 
 
  
231 
 
References 
 
Adler, Jonathan E. 1997. Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating. Journal of Philosophy. 94: 435-
452. 
ALDRICH, VC. 1966. Telling, Acknowledging and Asserting. Analysis 27 (2): 53–56.  
Alicke, Mark, David Rose & Dori Bloom. 2014. Causation, norm violation, and culpable control. 
In J. Knobe & S. Nichols (eds.). Experimental Philosophy (vol. 2), 229-250. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Alston, WJ. 2000. Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
Anscombe, Elizabeth. 1981. Ethics, Religion and Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Aquinas. [ST] Summa Theologiae 
Arico, Adam J., & Fallis, Don. 2013. Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: An Empirical Investigation 
of the Concept of Lying. Philosophical Psychology 26 (6): 790-816. 
Augustine. [DDC] De Doctrina Christiana 
Augustine. 1887 [DM]. De mendacio [On lying]. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, 
Vol. 3. ed. by Philip Schaff. Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co.  
Austin, John L. 1961/2003. Performative Utterances. In J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 3rd edn. 
Austin, John L. 1962/1975. How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
edn. 
Bach, Kent and Robert M. Harnish. 1979. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Bach, Kent. 1975. Performatives are statements too. Philosophical Studies 28: 229-236. 
Bach, Kent. 2007. Knowledge in and out of context. In Campbell, J. K. & O’Rourke, M. (eds.), 
Knowledge and skepticism. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Bach, Kent. 2008. Applying Pragmatics to Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 18 (1): 68–88. 
Barnes, John A. 1994. A Pack of Lies: Towards A Sociology of Lying. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bazzanella, Carla, Caffi, Claudia & Sbisà, Marina. 1991. Scalar dimensions of illocutionary force. 
In Igor Ž. Žagar (ed.), Speech acts: fiction or reality (63-76). Antwerp/Ljubljana: IPrA Distribution 
Center for Yugoslavia and Institute for Social Sciences. 
Bazzanella, Carla. 2009. Approssimazioni pragmatiche e testuali alla menzogna. (Pragmatic and 
textual approaches to the concept of lying). In Tra Pragmatica e Linguistica testuale. Ricordando 
Maria-Elisabeth Conte, Venier Federica (ed.), 67–90. Dell’Orso: Alessandria.  
Beardsley, Monroe C. 1981. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing (Second Edition, 1958). 
Belnap, Nuel D. 2000. Double Time References: Speech-act Reports as Modalities in an 
Indeterminist Setting. Advances in modal logic 3: 37-58. 
232 
 
Benton, Matthew A. 2013. Dubious Objections from Iterated Conjunctions. Philosophical Studies 
162 (July 2011): 355–58. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9769-3. 
Benton, Matthew A. 2014. Gricean Quality. Noûs 50 (4): 689–703. doi:10.1111/nous.12065. 
Benton, Matthew A. forthcoming. Lying, Belief, and Knowledge. In J. Meibauer, The Oxford 
Handbook on Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Boghossian , Paul A. 2003. The normativity of content. Philosophical Issues 13: 31–45. 
Bok, Sissela. 1978. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York NY: Random House.  
Boyd, Kenneth. 2015. Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Epistemic Separabilism. Philosophical 
Studies 172 (7): 1907–27. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0378-9. 
Brandom, Robert. 1983. Asserting. Nous 17 (4): 637–650.  
Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
Commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Brown, Jessica. 2008. The Knowledge Norm for Assertion. Philosophical Issues 18(1): 89-103.  
Caffi, Claudia. 1999. On Mitigation, Journal of pragmatics 31: 881-909. 
Caffi, Claudia. 2007. Mitigation. London: Elsevier. 
Cappelen, Herman. 2011. Against Assertion. In Brown, J. & Cappelen, H. (Eds.). Assertion: New 
Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carson, Thomas L. 1988. On the Definition of Lying: A reply to Jones and revisions. Journal of 
Business Ethics 7:509-514. 
Carson, Thomas L. 2006. The definition of lying. Nous 2: 284–306. 
Carson, Thomas L. 2009. Lying, deception, and related concepts. In The philosophy of deception, 
ed. Clancy Martin, 153–87. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Carson, Thomas L. 2010. Lying and Deception. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carson, Thomas L., Richard E Wokutch and Kent F Murrmann. 1982. Bluffing in Labor 
Negotiations: Legal and Ethical Issues. Journal of Business Ethics 1(1): 13–22. 
Carter, J Adam. 2017. Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy. Synthese 194 (5): 1463–
76. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5. 
Carter, J. Adam. 2017. Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy. Synthese 194 (5): 1463–
76. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5. 
Carter, JA. & EC. Gordon. 2011. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic 
Support. Philosophia 39(4): 615–635. 
Chan, T., & Kahane, G. 2011. The trouble with being sincere. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
41(2): 215–234. 
Chan, Timothy, and Guy Kahane. 2011. The Trouble with Being Sincere. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 41 (2): 1–13. 
Chen, Rong, Chunmei Hu and Lin He. 2013. Lying between English and Chinese: An Intercultural 
Comparative Study. Intercultural Pragmatics 10.3: 375-401.  
Chisholm, Roderick M. & Feehan, Thomas D. 1977. The intent to deceive. Journal of Philosophy 
74(3): 143–159.  
233 
 
Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Coates, Jennifer. 1987. Epistemic modality and spoken discourse. Transactions of the Philological 
Society 85(1): 110–131. 
Coffman, E. J. 2014. Lenient accounts of warranted assertability. In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (Eds.), 
Epistemic norms: new essays on action, belief and assertion (33–59). Oxford: Oxford University 
press. 
Cole, Shirley A. N. 1996. Semantic Prototypes and the Pragmatics of Lie Across Cultures. The 
LACUS Forum 23:475-83.  
Coleman, Linda and Paul Kay. 1981. Prototype Semantics: The English Verb ‘lie’. Language 57: 
26-44. 
D’Agostini, Franca. 2012. Menzogna (Lying). Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. 
Davidson, D. 2001. Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press 
Davidson, Donald. 1985. Deception and Division. In J. Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dawkins, Richard. 1989. The Selfish Gene (2nd ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in 
everyday life. Journal of personality and social psychology, 70(5), 979. 
DeRose, K. 2002. Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. The Philosophical Review 111(2): 167-203. 
DeRose, Keith. 1991. Epistemic possibilities. The Philosophical Review 100(4): 581–605. DOI: 
10.2307/2185175. 
Donagan, Alan. 1977. A Theory of Morality. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Douven, Igor. 2006. Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility. Philosophical Review 115 (4): 
449–85. doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-010. 
Douven, Igor. 2009. Assertion, Moore, and Bayes. Philosophical Studies 144 (3): 361–75. 
doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9214-4. 
Dummett, M. 1981. Assertion, in Frege: Philosophy of language. London: Duckworth. 
Dynel, Marta. 2011. A Web of Deceit: A Neo-Gricean View on Types of Verbal Deception. 
International Review of Pragmatics 3 (2): 137–137. doi:10.1163/187731011X610996. 
Eco, Umberto. 1976. Trattato di Semiotica Generale. Milano: Bompiani. Translated as A theory 
of Semiotics. London: MacMillan. 
Egan, Andy & Weatherson, Brian (eds). 2011. Epistemic Modality. Oxford: 
OUP. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001. 
Egan, Andy, Hawthorne, John & Weatherson, Brian. 2005. Epistemic modals in context. In 
Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning and Truth, Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter 
(eds). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Ekman, Paul. 1985. Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Marriage, and Politics. New 
York: W.W. Norton. 
Engel , Pascal. 2007. Belief and normativity? Disputatio , 2 ( 23 ), 153–77 
Engel, Pascal. 2008. IN WHAT SENSE IS KNOWLEDGE THE NORM OF ASSERTION. 
Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1): 99–113. 
234 
 
Engel, Pascal. 2013. In defence of normativism about the aim of belief. In Chan, T. (ed.) The Aim 
of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eriksson, John. 2011. Straight Talk: Conceptions of Sincerity in Speech. Philosophical Studies 153 
(2): 213–234. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9487-2. 
Fadiman, Clifton.1985. The Little, Brown Book of Anecdotes. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Falkenberg, Gabriel. 1988. Insincerity and disloyalty. Argumentation 2.1: 89-97. 
Falkenberg, Gabriel. 1990. Searle on sincerity. In Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions. Walter 
de Gruyter, Berlin, 129-145. 
Fallis, Don. 2009. What Is Lying ? The Journal of Philosophy 106 (1): 29–56. 
Fallis, Don. 2010. Lying and deception. Philosophers’ Imprint, (10) 1–22. 
Fallis, Don. 2011. What liars can tell us about the knowledge norm of practical reasoning. The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 49(4): 347–367. DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00078.x. 
Fallis, Don. 2012. Lying as a Violation of Grice’s First Maxim of Quality. Dialectica 66 (4): 563–
581. 
Fallis, Don. 2013. Davidson was Almost Right about Lying. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 
91(2): 337–353. http://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2012.688980 
Fallis, Don. 2015. Are Bald-Faced Lies Deceptive after All? Ratio 28(1):81-96. 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/rati.12055. 
Faulkner, P., 2007. What is Wrong with Lying? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75: 
524–547. 
Faulkner, Paul. 2013. Lying and Deceit. In Hugh Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of 
Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 3101-3109. 
Feehan, Thomas D. 1988. Augustine on Lying and Deception. Augustinian Studies, 131–39. 
Feldman, R. S., Forrest, J. A., & Happ, B. R. 2002. Self-presentation and verbal deception: Do self-
presenters lie more? Basic and applied social psychology, 24(2), 163-170. 
Foot, Philippa. 2001. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Frankfurt, H. G. 1999. The Faintest Passion. In Necessity, Volition and Love, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 95-107. 
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1986. On Bullshit. Raritan Quarterly Review 6:2, 81-100. 
Frankish, Keith. 2009. Partial belief and flat-out belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri 
(eds), Degrees of Belief (75–93). Berlin: Springer. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_4. 
Fraser, Bruce. 1980. Conversational mitigation. Journal of Pragmatics 4: 341-350. 
Fraser, Bruce. 2010. Pragmatic Competence: The Case of Hedging. In New Approaches to 
Hedging, ed. G. Kaltenbo, W. Mihatsch & Schneider Stefan, 15–34. Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited.  
Frege, G. 1918. Der Gedanke. Beiträge Zur Philosophie Des Deutschen Idealismus. 58–77.  
Frege, Gottlob. 1879. Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des 
reinen Denkens [Concept Script, a formal language of pure thought modelled upon that of 
arithmetic]. Halle: L. Nebert. In From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, ed. 
by Jan van Heijenoort. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
235 
 
Frege, Gottlob.1892. Über sinn und bedeutung, Zeitschrift Für Philosophie Und Philosophische 
Kritik [On sense and nominatum]100: 22–50. 
Fried, Charles. 1978. Right and Wrong. Cambridge: Harvard 
Fried, Charles. 1981. Contract as Promise. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Friend, Stacie. 2008. Imagining Fact and Fiction. In New Waves in Aesthetics, edited by Kathleen 
Jones and Katherine Thomson-Jones. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Friend, Stacie. 2014. Believing in Stories. In Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind, edited by Greg 
Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin, and Jon Robson, 227–48. 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669639.003.0012. 
Gale, Richard M. 1971. The Fictive Use of Language. Philosophy 46 (178) 324–40. 
doi:10.2307/3750012. 
Garcìa-Carpintero, Manuel. 2004. Assertion and the Semantics of Force-Markers. In C. Bianchi 
(ed.) The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction: 133–166. Stanford: The University of Chicago Press. 
Garcìa-Carpintero, Manuel. 2013. Explicit Performatives Revisited. Journal of Pragmatics 49: 1–
17.  
Gerken, M. 2014. Same, same but different: the epistemic norms of assertion, action and practical 
reasoning. Philosophical Studies 168(3): 725-744. 
Gerken, Mikkel. 2012. Discursive Justification and Skepticism. Synthese 189 (2): 373–94. 
doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0076-0. 
Ginet, Carl, 1979. Performativity. Linguistics & Philosophy 3: 245-265.  
Goldberg, S. 2015. Assertion. On the philosophical significance of assertoric speech. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gottwald, Siegfried. 2001. A treatise on many-valued logics. Baldock: Research Studies Press. 
Graff, Gerald. 1980. Poetic Statement and Critical Dogma. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press. 
Graff,Gerald. 1979. Literature against Itself. Literary Ideas in Modern Society. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Green, Mitchell S. 2000. Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content. Linguistics and Philosophy  
23: 435–473. 
Green, Mitchell S. 2007. Self-Expression. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Green, Mitchell S. 2013. Assertions. In Pragmatics of Speech Actions, Vol. II of the Handbook of 
Pragmatics, II:0–33. 
Greenough, Patrick. 2011. Truth‐Relativism, Norm‐Relativism, and Assertion. In Assertion: New 
Philosophical Essays, 197-232. doi:10.1093/acprof. 
Grice, Herbert P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Griffiths, P. J. 2004. Lying: An Augustinian theology of duplicity. Wipf and Stock Publishers. 
Grotius, Hugo. [RWP]. The Rights of War and Peace. F. W. Kelsey (trans.), Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill.  
Gussenhoven, Carlos. 2002. Intonation and interpretation: phonetics and phonology. In 
236 
 
Proocedings of the Speech Prosody International Conference, ed. by Stefan Sudhoff et al, 47-57. 
Aix en Provence: Laboratoire Parole et Langage. 
Hájek, Petr. 1998. Metamathematics of fuzzy logic. Dodrecht: Kluwer. 
Hardin, Karol J. forthcoming. Linguistic Approaches to Lying and Deception. In Meibauer, J. (ed.) 
The Oxford Handbook on Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hare, Richard. 1952. The language of morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harris, Roy. 1978. The descriptive interpretation of performative utterances. Journal of Linguistics 
14(2): 309-310. 
Hartman, N. 1975. Ethics. Translated by S. Coit. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. 
Hawthorne, J. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heal, J. 1974. Explicit Performative Utterances and Statements. The Philosophical Quarterly 
24(95). http://doi.org/10.2307/2217715 
Hedenius, Ingemar. 1963. Performatives. Theoria 29: 115-36. 
Hill, Christopher S, and Joshua Schechter. 2007. HAWTHORNE’S LOTTERY PUZZLE AND 
THE NATURE OF BELIEF. Philosophical Issues 17. 
Hinchman, Edward S. 2013. Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge. Noûs 47 (4): 613–46. 
doi:10.1111/nous.12045. 
Hindriks, F. 2007. The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 
30(3): 393– 406  
Hindriks, F. 2009. Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology. Erkenntnis 71 (2): 253–275.  
Hirst, Paul H. 1973. Literature and the Fine Arts as a Unique Form of Knowledge, Cambridge 
Journal of Education 3 (3): 118-132. 
Holmes, Janet. 1984. Modifying illocutionary force. Journal of Pragmatics 8: 345–365. DOI: 
10.1016/0378-2166(84)90028-6. 
Holton, Richard. 2008. Partial Belief, Partial Intention. Mind 117: 27–58.  
Hoye, Leo. 1997. Adverbs and modality in English. London, New York: Longman. 
Huber, Franz & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.). 2009. Degrees of belief. Springer. 
Humberstone, Lloyd. 1992. Direction of Fit. Mind 101 (401). 
Hume, David. [THN]. A treatise on human nature. NY: Oxford University Press.  
Isenberg, Arnold. 1964. Deontology and the Ethics of Lying. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 24: 463-480. 
Jary, Mark. 2007. Are explicit performatives assertions? Linguistics and Philosophy 30(2): 207 - 
234. 
Johnson, Casey Rebecca. 2017. What Norm of Assertion? Acta Analytica, May. Springer 
Netherlands, 1–17. doi:10.1007/s12136-017-0326-3. 
Juhl, P. D. 1980. Interpretation. An Essay in the Philosophy of Literary Criticism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
Kant, Immanuel. [CPR]. Critique of pure reason. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan 
237 
 
Kant, Immanuel. [GMM]. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. by M. J. Gregor 
(trans.). In A. W. Wood and M. J. Gregor (eds.), Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, Immanuel. [SRTL]. On a Supposed Right To Lie from Philanthropy. In Gregor, Mary J. 
(ed., trans.), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant- Practical Philosophy, 605-
616. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Keiser, Jessica. 2015. Bald-Faced Lies: How to Make a Move in a Language Game without Making 
a Move in a Conversation. Philosophical Studies 1 (2014). Springer Netherlands: 251–64. 
doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0502-5. 
Kemp, Gary. 2007. Assertion as a Practice. In Truth and Speech-Acts, edited by D. Greimann and 
G. Siegwart, 106–29. Routledge. 
Kenyon, Tim. 2003. CYNICAL ASSERTION: CONVENTION, PRAGMATICS, and SAYING 
‘ UNCLE’. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3): 241–48. 
Kenyon, Tim. 2010. ASSERTION AND CAPITULATION. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91: 
352–68. 
Kingsbury, Justine and Jonathan McKeown-Green. 2009. Definitions: Does Disjunction Mean 
Dysfunction? Journal of Philosophy 106:568-85 
Klein, Peter. 1998. Certainty. In Edward Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 264-267. 
Knobe, Joshua. 2003. Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis 279: 190–
194. 
Koethe, John. 2009. Knowledge and the Norms of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
87 (4): 625–38. doi:10.1080/00048400802598660. 
Kölbel, Max 2010. Literal Force: A Defence of Conventional Assertion. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New 
Waves in Philosophy of Language. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 108–37. 
Kratzer, Angelika. 1981. The notional category of modality. In Hans-Jürgen Eikmeyer & Hannes 
Rieser (eds), Worlds, Words, and Contexts, 38–74. Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Krishna, Daya. 1961. ‘Lying’ and the Compleat Robot. The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 12 (46). 
Kupfer, Joseph. 1982. The moral presumption against lying. The Review of Metaphysics 36(1): 
103–126. 
Kurthy, M., Lawford-Smith, H., & Sousa, P. (2017). Does ought imply can? PloS one, 12(4), 
e0175206. 
Kvanvig, J. 2009. Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries. In Greenough, P. & Pritchard, D. (eds.) 
Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011. Norms of Assertion. In J. Brown and H. Cappelen (eds.) Assertion: 
New Philosophical Essays. doi:10.1093/acprof. 
Labinaz, Paolo, and Marina Sbisà. 2014. Certainty and Uncertainty in Assertive Speech Acts. In 
Communicating Certainty and Uncertainty in Medical, Supportive and Scientific Contexts, Ilaria 
Riccioni, Carla Canestrari, Andrzej Zuczkowski, and Ramona Bongelli (eds.). Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Labov, W. 1984. Intensity. In Georgetown University Round Table on Language and Linguistics, 
238 
 
ed. by Deborah Schiffrin 43-70. Washington: Georgetown University Press. 
Lackey, J. 2007. Norms of Assertion. Nous 41(4): 594–626. 
Lackey, Jennifer. 2013. Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce. Analysis 73 (2): 236–48. 
doi:10.1093/analys/ant006. 
Lakoff, George. 1975. Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts. 
Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4): 458–508.  
Lamarque, Peter & Stein Haugom Olsen.1994. Truth, Fiction, and Literature. A Philosophical 
Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Leland, Patrick R. 2015. Rational Responsibility and the Assertoric Character of Bald-Faced Lies. 
Analysis 75 (4): 550-554doi:10.1093/analys/anv080. 
Lemmon, J.E. 1962. Sentences verifiable by their use. Analysis 12: 86-89. 
Leonard, Henry S. 1959. Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity and Lies. Philosophy of Science 
26: 172-186. 
Levine, T. R. (ed.). 2014. Encyclopedia of deception. SAGE Publications. 
Levinson, Stephen. C. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: CUP. 
Lewis, D. 1979. Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359. 
Lewis, David. 1970. General Semantics. Synthese 22: 18-67 
Lindley, T. Foster. 1971. Lying and Falsity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 152–157. 
Lyons, John, 1977. Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
MacCormick, N. (1983). WHAT IS WRONG WITH DECEIT? Sydney Law Review. 
MacFarlane, John. 2003. Epistemic Modalities and Relative Truth. Unpublished, Url= 
<http://johnmacfarlane.net/epistmod-2003.pdf>. 
MacFarlane, John. 2003. Future Contingents and Relative Truth. The Philosophical Quarterly 53 
(212): 321–36. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00315. 
MacFarlane, John. 2005. Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 
105 (1). 
MacFarlane, John. 2011. What is Assertion? In J. Brown and H. Cappelen (eds.) Assertion: New 
Philosophical Essays, 79-96. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1994. Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn from 
Mill and Kant? The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 16: 307-61. 
Mahon, James Edwin. 2007. A Definition of Deceiving. International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 21 (2). 
Mahon, James Edwin. 2008. Two Definitions of Lying. International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 211–230. 
Mahon, James Edwin. 2009. Why There are No Bald-Faced Lies. Paper presented at the 
Information Ethics Roundtable.https://itunes.apple.com/it/podcast/why-there-are-no-bald-faced-
lies/id413143120?i=1000092195610&mt=2 
Mahon, James Edwin. 2010. The definition of lying, and why it matters. Roundtable at the School 
of Info Resources and Library Sciences, https://itunesu.itunes.apple.com/feed/id413143120. 
239 
 
Mahon, James Edwin. 2011. Review of Lying and Deception by Thomas L. Carson, Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24572-lying-and-deception-theory-and-practice/ 
Mahon, James Edwin. 2016. The Definition of Lying and Deception, in Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition). 
Maitra, Ishani. 2011. Assertion, Norms, and Games. In Brown, J. & Cappelen, H. (eds.). Assertion: 
New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mannison, Don S. 1969. Lying and lies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2(47): 132–144. DOI: 
10.1080/00048406912341141. 
Margolis, Joseph 1965, The Language of Art and Art Criticism. Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press. 
Margolis, Joseph. 1962. “Lying Is Wrong” and “Lying Is Not Always Wrong”. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 23: 414–418. 
Marsili, Neri. 2014. Lying as a Scalar Phenomenon: Insincerity along the Certainty-Uncertainty 
Continuum. In S. Cantarini, W. Abraham, and E. Leiss (eds.). Certainty-Uncertainty – and the 
Attitudinal Space in between, 153–173. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
10.1075/slcs.165.09mar 
Marsili, Neri. 2015. Normative accounts of assertion: from Peirce to Williamson, and back again. 
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio (2). 
Marsili, Neri. 2016. Lying by Promising. International Review of Pragmatics, 8(2), 271–313. 
http://doi.org/10.1163/18773109-00802005  
Marsili, Neri. 2017. Lying and Certainty. In J.Meibauer, The Oxford Handbook on Lying. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Marušić, Berislav. 2012. Belief and difficult action. Philosopher's Imprint 12(18). 
Marušić, Berislav. 2013. Promising against the Evidence. Ethics 123(2): 292–317.  
McCammon, C. 2014. Representing Yourself as Knowing. American Philosophical Quarterly 
51(2): 1–14.  
McKenna, Robin. 2015. Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
93 (4) (October 2): 782–798. 
Meibauer, Jörg . 2005. Lying and Falsely Implicating. Journal of Pragmatics 37(9): 1373–1399. 
Meibauer, Jörg. 2011. On Lying: Intentionality, Implicature, and Imprecision. Intercultural 
Pragmatics 2 (8): 277–292.  
Meibauer, Jörg. 2014. Lying at the semantic-pragmatic interface. Berlin: De Gruyter.  
Meibauer, Jörg. 2014b. Bald-Faced Lies as Acts of Verbal Aggression. Journal of Language 
Aggression and Conflict 2 (1): 127–50. doi:10.1075/jlac.2.1.05mei. 
Meibauer, Jörg. 2014c. A Truth That’s Told with Bad Intent: Lying and Implicit Content. Belgian 
Journal of Linguistics 28: 97–118. doi:10.1075/bjl.28.05mei. 
Meibauer, Jörg. 2016. Understanding Bald-Faced Lies. International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2): 
247–70. doi:10.1163/18773109-00802004. 
Mele, Alfred. 1992. Springs of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mikhail, J. 2011. Elements of moral cognition: Rawls' linguistic analogy and the cognitive science 
240 
 
of moral and legal judgment. Cambridge University Press. 
Mikkonen, Jukka. 2010. Implicit Assertions in Literary Fiction. Proceedings of the European 
Society for Aesthetics 2 (1960): 312–30. 
Montaigne, Michel. 1595 [E]. Essais. Verdun: P. Villey et Saulnier. 
Montminy, M. 2013. The Single Norm of Assertion. In A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, & M. Carapezza 
(Eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy: 35–52. 
Moore, George. 1966. Ethics (2nd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Moore, George. 1993. Selected Essays. London: Routledge.  
Moran, Richard. 2005. Getting Told and Being Believed. Philosophers’ Imprint. 5(5). 
Moran, Richard. 2005. Problems with sincerity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 325–
345. 
Nagel, T., 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Newey, G., 1997. Political Lying: A Defense. Public Affairs Quarterly 11: 93–116. 
Owens, David. 2008. Promising without Intending. The Journal of Philosophy 105(12): 737–755.  
Pagin, Peter. 2015. Assertion, In E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2015 edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/assertion/>.   
Pagin, Peter. 2016. Problems with Norms of Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 93 (1): 178–207. doi:10.1111/phpr.12209.  
Papafragou, A. 2006. Epistemic modality and truth conditions. Lingua 116(10), 1688–1702. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2005.05.009. 
Parsons, T. 1978. Review of John Woods: Logic of Fiction. Synthese, 39, 155-164. 
Peirce, Charles S. [CP] Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. Edited by Charles 
Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1931–1958).  
Peirce, Charles S. [MS] The Charles S. Peirce Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Library, 
1966, microfilm, 33 reels including supplement)  
Pelling, Charlie. 2013. Assertion and Safety. Synthese 190 (17): 3777–96. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-
0223-7. 
Pelling, C. 2013b. Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge. The Philosophical Quarterly 63(251). 
http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12013 
Pepp, Jessica. forthcoming. Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems about Saying what You 
Think is False. In E. Michaelson and A. Stokke (eds.), Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Peter Lombard. [SEN] Libri Quattuor Sententiarum. 
Plantinga, Alvin. 1978. The nature of necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Plunze, Christian. 2001. Try to Make Your Contribution One that is True. Acta Philosophica 
Fennica 69:177-89. 
Poggi, I., D’Errico, F., & Vincze, L. 2011. Discrediting moves in political debates. In Proceedings 
of second international workshop on user models for motivational systems: the affective and the 
rational routes to persuasion. Springer LNCS: 84-99. 
241 
 
Pollock, JL. 1982. Language and Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Price, Huw. 1983. Does ‘Probably’ Modify Sense? Australasian Journal of Philosophy : 37–41. 
Primoratz, Igor. 1984. Lying and the 'Methods of Ethics', International Studies in Philosophy 
XVI:35-57 
Pritchard, D. 2013. Epistemic luck, safety, and assertion. In J. Turri & C. Littlejohn (Eds.), 
Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rawls, J. 1955. Two Concepts of Rules. The Philosophical Review 64(1): 3–32. 
Rawls, John. 1981. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Récanati, François. 1987. Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative Utterances. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Reed, Baron. 2008. Certainty. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/certainty. 
Reichert, John. 1981. Do Poets Ever Mean What They Say? New Literary History. 13 (1):53-68. 
Reichert, John.1977. Making Sense of Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Reimer, Marga. 1995. Performative utterances: a reply to Bach and Harnish. Linguistics and 
Philosophy 18: 655-675. 
Reimer, Marga. 2004. What malapropisms mean: A reply to Donald Davidson, Erkenntnis 60(3): 
317– 334. 
Rescorla, M. 2007. A Linguistic Reason for Truthfulness. In Truth and Speech Acts, edited by Dirk 
Greimann and Geo Siegwart, Routledge. 
Rescorla, M. 2009. Assertion and Its Constitutive Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research LXXIX (1): 98–130.  
Reynolds, Steven L. 2002. Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies 110 
(2): 139–61. doi:10.1023/A:1020254327114. 
Richard Ohmann. 1971. Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature. Philosophy & Rhetoric 4 
(1). 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40236740.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A59add992bef1d42defff9f8a
31a4df7b. 
Ridge, Michael. 2006. Sincerity and expressivism. Philosophical Studies 131: 487–510. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s 
Ridge, Michael. 2011. Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative. In E. Zalta (ed.) The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/reasons-agent/>. 
Ross, David. 1930. The Right and the Good, reprinted in 2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rowe, M. W. 1997. Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth. The Philosophical Quarterly 
47(188): 322-41. 
Rutschmann, Ronja, and Alex Wiegmann. 2017. No Need for an Intention to Deceive? 
Challenging the Traditional Definition of Lying. PhilosoPhical Psychology. 
doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1277382. 
Ryan S. 2003. Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief. Philosophical Studies. 114(1–2):47–
242 
 
79 
Saul, Jennifer M. 2011. Just go ahead and lie. Analysis 72(1): 3–9. 
Saul, Jennifer M. 2012. Lying, Misleading, and what is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of 
Language and in Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sbisà, Marina. 2001. Illocutionary force and degrees of strength in language use. Journal of 
Pragmatics 33: 1791–1814. DOI: 10.1016/S0378-2166(00)00060-6 
Sbisà, Marina. 2016. Varieties of Speech Act Norms. In Dynamics and Varieties of Speech Actions. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004. 
Schaffer, J. 2008. Knowledge in the image of assertion. Philosophical issues 18(1). 
Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1974. Parerga e Paralipomena. Translated by EFJ Payne (vol 2).  
Schwyzer, H. 196). Rules and Practices. Philosophical Review 78(4). 
Searle, John R and Daniel Vanderveken. 1985. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Searle, John R. 1964. How to Derive Ought from Is. The Philosophical Review 73(1), 43-58 
Searle, John R. 1965. What is a speech act? In Black, M.(ed.) Philosophy in America, 221-39. 
London, Allen & Unwin. 
Searle, John R. 1969. Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139173438 
Searle, John R. 1975. The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse. New Literary History 6 (2): 319–
32. 
Searle, John R. 1976. A Classification of Illocutionary Acts. Language in Society 5 (1): 1–23. 
Searle, John R. 1989. How performatives work. Linguistics & Philosophy 12:535-558. 
Searle, John R. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York, The Free Press. 
Searle, John R. 2007. Illocutionary acts and the concept of truth. In Truth and Speech-Acts, edited 
by D. Greimann and G. Siegwart, 106–29. Routledge.  
Searle, John R., and Daniel Vanderveken. 2005. Speech acts and illocutionary logic. Logic, 
Thought and Action. Springer Netherlands. 109-132. 
Seierstad, Asne. 2003. A Hundred and One Days: A Baghdad Journal, trans. by Ingrid 
Christophersen. New York: Basic Books. 
Shah, Nishi .2003. How truth governs belief . Philosophical Review 112: 447–82 . 
Shah, Nishi and J. David Velleman. 2005. Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114: 497–
534. 
Sidgwick, Henry. 1981 [1874]. The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis. IN: Hackett. 
Sidney, S. P. 1595. An Apology For Poetry (Or The Defence Of Poesy). Manchester: Manchester 
University Press (Revised and Expanded Second Edition, 2002). 
Siegler, Frederick A. 1966. Lying. American Philosophical Quarterly 3: 128-136. 
Simpson, David. 1992. Lying, Liars and Language, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
52: 623-639. 
243 
 
Smith, David. L. 2004. Why We Lie: The Evolutionary Roots of Deception and the Unconscious 
Mind. St. Martin's Press 
Unconscious Mind. St. Martin's Press. 
Sorensen, Roy. 2007. Bald Faced Lies! Lying without the intent to deceive. Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 88: 251–264.  
Sorensen, Roy. 2010. Knowledge-Lies. Analysis 70 (4) (August 7): 608–615. 
doi:10.1093/analys/anq072. 
Sorensen, Roy. 2011. What lies behind misspeaking. American Philosophical Quarterly 48(4): 
399-409. 
Sosa, David. 2009. Dubious Assertions. Philosophical Studies 146 (August 2008): 269–72. 
doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9255-8. 
Staffel, Julia. 2011. Reply to Sorensen, ‘knowledge-lies’. Analysis 71: 300–303.  
Staffel, Julia. 2012. Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief? Synthese 2011: 1–20 
Stalnaker, Robert. 1978. Assertion. In R. Stalnaker, Context and content, 78–95. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Stalnaker, Robert. 1998. On the representation of context. In R. Stalnaker, Context and content, 
96–114. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Stanley, Jason. 2008. Knowledge and certainty. Philosophical Issues 18.1 35-5. 
Stern R. 2004. Does ‘ought’ imply ‘can’? And did Kant think it does? Utilitas.16(1):42–61.  
Stokke, Andreas. 2013. Lying and asserting. Journal of Philosophy 110(1): 33–60.  
Stokke, Andreas. 2013b. Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading. Philosophy Compass 8: 348–359. 
Stokke, Andreas. 2014. Insincerity. Noûs 48 (3): 496–520. doi:10.1111/nous.12001. 
Stokke, Andreas. 2016. Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (May): 1–6. doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1185739. 
Stone, Jim. 2007. Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 92–
113. doi:doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00282.x. 
Swanson, Eric. 2011. How not to theorize about the language of subjective uncertainty. In Epistemic 
Modality, Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds), 249–269. Oxford: OUP. DOI: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.003.0009. 
Sweetser, Eve. 1987. The definition of lie: an examination of the folk models underlying a semantic 
prototype, in D. Holland and Q. Naomi (eds.), Cultural Models in Language and Thought, 3-66. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Swift, Jonathan. 1710. The Art of Political Lying. The Examiner, 10. 
Turri, Angelo and John Turri. 2015. The Truth about Lying. Cognition. 138: 161–168.  
Turri, J. 2013. The Test of Truth: An Experimental Investigation of the Norm of Assertion. 
Cognition 129 (2): 279–291. 
Turri, John, and Peter Blouw. 2015. “Excuse Validation: A Study in Rule-Breaking.” Philosophical 
Studies 172 (3): 615–34. 
Turri, John. 2010. Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism. Philosophical Review 
119 (1): 77–95. 
244 
 
Turri, John. 2011. The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 89 (1): 37–45. 
Turri, John. 2013. Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion. Philosophical Studies 167 (3): 557–67. 
Urmson, J. O. 1976. Fiction American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2): 153-157. 
Van der Henst, Jean-Baptiste, Laure Carles & Dan Sperber. 2002. Truthfulness and Relevance in 
Telling The Time. Mind and Language, 17 (5) (November): 457–466.  
Van der Schaar, Maria. 2011. Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive 
Type Theory. Synthese 183: 187–210. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9758-7. 
Van Inwagen, Peter. 1977. Creatures of Fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4): 299–
308. 
Vanderveken, D. 1990. Meaning and Speech Acts: Volume 1, Principles of Language Use (Vol. 1). 
Cambridge University Press. 
Vanderveken, Daniel. 1980. Illocutionary logic and self-defeating speech acts. In J.R. Searle, F. 
Kiefer and M. Bierwisch, Speech act theory and pragmatics, 247-272. Amsterdam: Springer. 
Viebahn, E. 2017. Non-literal Lies. Erkenntnis. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9880-8 
Vlach, F. 1981. Speaker's meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy. 4 (3),359-391.  
Von Fintel, Kai, & Anthony S. Gillies. 2008. CIA leaks. Philosophical review, 117(1), 77-98. 
doi: 10.1215/00318108-2007-025 
Vrij, A. 2008. Detecting Lies and Deceit. Pitfalls and Opportunities. 2nd ed, 1st ed. 2000. 
Chichester: Wiley 
Walton, Kendall. 1990. Mimesis as make-believe: On the foundations of the representational arts. 
Harvard University Press. 
Watson, Gary. 2004. Asserting and Promising. Philosophical Studies 117(1): 57–77. 
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002. The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 16, 267–97.  
Weiner, Matthew. 2005. Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2): 227–251. 
Whiting, Daniel. 2010. Should I Believe the Truth? Dialectica 64 (2): 213–24. doi:10.1111/j.1746-
8361.2009.01204.x. 
Whiting, Daniel. 2012. Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion. Erkenntnis 78 (4): 847–867.  
Whiting, Daniel. 2013. The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False). Philosophy 88: 219-
242 
Wiegmann, Alex, Jana Samland & Michael R. Waldmann, 2016. Lying despite telling the truth. 
Cognition 150: 37-42.  
Williams, Bernard. 1966. Consistency and realism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  40: 1-
22.  
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Williams, Bernard. 2002. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press . 
Williams, John N. 1996. Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion. Australasian Journal 
245 
 
of Philosophy 74 (September 2014): 135–49. doi:10.1080/00048409612347111. 
Williamson, Timothy. 1996. Knowing and Asserting. The Philosophical Review 105, 4, 489–523. 
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Assertion. In Knowledge and Its Limits, 238-270. Oxford University 
Press. 
Wilson, Deirdre & Dan Sperber. 2002. Truthfulness and Relevance. Mind 25: 1–41. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. [PI]. Philosophical investigations. 4th ed., trans. by Anscombe, Hacker & 
Schulte. Wiley-Blackwell 
Wood, D., 1973. Honesty. In A. Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy and Personal Relations: An Anglo-
French Study, London: Routledge, 192–218. 
Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.  
Xu, Fen, Yang C. Luo, Genyue Fu, and Kang Lee. 2009. Children’s and adults’ conceptualization 
and evaluation of lying and truth-telling. Infant and Child Development 18(4): 307–322. 
Yalcin, Seth. 2007. Epistemic Modals. Mind, 116(464), 983–1026. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm983 
Yalcin, Seth. 2011. Nonfactualism about epistemic modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson 
(eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press. 
 
